360. Halder KTB, iii.350 (16 December 1941).
361. DRZW, iv.607 n.592.
362. Bock, 396–9 (16–19 December 1941); Halder KTB, iii.354 (18 December 1941); Below, 298 (referring to 18 December 1941); DRZW, iv.612 and n.608. Within weeks Bock, evidently having made a remarkable recovery, was given the command of Army Group South (DRZW, iv.612 n.608, 646).
363. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941).
364. Halder KTB, iii.285 (10 November 1941).
365. Halder KTB, iii.322 (1 December 1941).
366. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941).
367. Engel, 117 (6 December 1941); Halder KTB, iii.332 (7 December 1941).
368. Engel, 117 (6 December 1941); Irving, HW, 351, 854.
369. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941); 117 (7 December 1941); Below, 297 (referring to 9 December 1941).
370. See Bock, 395 (16 December 1941). Three months later, speaking to Goebbels, Hitler attributed much of the blame for the winter crisis to Brauchitsch. He showed nothing but contempt for his former Army Commander-in-Chief, whom he described as a ‘coward’ and wholly incapable (TBJG, II/3, 510 (20 March 1942)). Why he had retained such an unsatisfactory army chief so long in post, Hitler did not explain.
371. Below, 298; Engel, 115 (22 November 1941); 117 (6 December 1941). For biographical sketches of Kesselring, see Samuel J. Lewis, ‘Albert Kesselring — Der Soldat als Manager’, in Smelser/Syring, 270–87; Elmar Krautkrämer, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring’, in Ueberschär, Hitlers militärische Elite, i.121–9; Shelford Bidwell, ‘Kesselring’, in Correlli Barnett (ed.), Hitler’s Generals, London, 1989, 265–89. In The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, (1953), London, 1997, the change of army leadership in December 1941 is not mentioned.
372. Franz Halder, Hitler als Feldherr. Der ehemalige Chef des Generalstabes berichtet die Wahrheit, Munich, 1949, 45: ‘Das biβchen Operationsführung kann jeder machen.’
373. See Halder KTB, iii.354 and n.3 (19 December 1941); DRZW, iv.613 n.610, 614; Hartmann, 303.
374. Domarus, 1813–15.
375. A point also made in DRZW, iv.619.
376. Domarus, 1815.
377. TBJG, II/2, 554 (21 December 1941); Tb Reuth, 1523, n.224.
378. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 176.
379. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Der Weg zur Teilung der Welt, Politik und Strategie von 1939–1945, Koblenz/Bonn, 1977,134–5; Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Das Dritte Reich. Bd.2: Weltmachtanspruch und nationaler Zusammenbruch 1939–1945, Munich, 1985, 66–7; trans. (slightly amended) N & P, iii.827–8.
380. DRZW, iv.614.
381. DRZW, iv.614–15; Guderian, 264, and 269–70 for conflict with Kluge; see also Below, 298, for Kluge’s influence. Bock and Guderian had also clashed in early September, to the extent that Bock had asked on 4 September for the tank commander’s replacement. See Bock, 298–306 (31 August-6 September 1941). Bock thought Guderian an ‘outstanding and brave commander’, but ‘headstrong’ (Bock, 304–5 (4–5 September 1941)).
382. Guderian, 265–8.
383. Guderian, 270.
384. Halder KTB, iii.369 (29 December 1941), iii.376–7 (8 January 1942), iii.386 (15 January 1942); Warlimont, 223.
385. See Irving, HW, 366; and also Leach, 225–6.
386. For the constant conflict between Hitler and Kluge during this period, see Halder KTB, iii.370–385 (30 December 1941–14 January 1942).
387. Schroeder, 126–8; Irving, HW, 354–5.
388. Halder KTB, iii.385, 388 (14 January 1942, 19 January 1942); KTB OKW, ii.1268–9 (15 January 1942).
389. Willi Boelcke (ed.), Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer 1942–1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, 126–30, here 127.
390. Warlimont, 223; TBJG, II/3, 511 (20 March 1942), 517 (21 March 42); CD, 461 (29 April 1942).
391. Halder, Hitler als Feldherr, 46–7; Guenther Blumentritt, ‘Moscow’, in The Fatal Decisions, London, 1956, 29–74, here 67; John Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander, London, 1971, 147. Alan Clark, Barbarossa. The Russian-German Conflict 1941–45, (1965) New York, 1985, 182–3, exaggerates the point in describing the ‘stand-still’ order as ‘Hitler’s finest hour’, when his ‘complete mastery of the detail even of a regimental action’ saved the German army.
