288. TBJG, II.2, 455 (9 December 1941). The Japanese Embassy in Berlin had initially reported the sinking of two battleships (Virginia and Oklahoma) and two cruisers (KTB OKW, i.803). In fact, the attack proved less of a military disaster in the long run than imagined at the time. The battleship Arizona was blown up, seven others grounded, and ten other ships sunk or damaged. Over 2,400 American servicemen were killed and a further 1,100 wounded. But the two aircraft carriers with the Pacific fleet were not in the harbour at the time and escaped. Most of the ships could be repaired. All the battleships except the Arizona returned to service (and contributed to later American naval victories). Most of the crew members survived and continued in service (Weinberg III, 260–61).
289. Weinberg III, 261.
290. Churchill, iii. 537–43 (quotation 538).
291. IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 8 December 1941: ‘Wir können den Krieg garnicht verlieren. Wir haben jetzt einen Bundesgenossen, der in 3 000 Jahren nicht besiegt worden ist…’ Hitler remarked, a few days later (entry for 16 December 1941): ‘Strange, that with the help of Japan we will destroy the positions of the white race in East Asia and that England fights against Europe with the Bolshevik swine.’ (‘Seltsam, daβ wir mit Hilfe Japans die Positionen der weiβen Rasse in Ostasien vernichten und daβ England mit den bolshewistischen Schweinen gegen Europa kämpft.’)
292. See Eberhard Jäckel, ‘Die deutsche Kriegserklärung an die Vereinigten Staaten von 1941’, in Friedrich J. Kroneck and Thomas Oppermann (eds.), Im Dienste Deutschlands und des Rechts: Festschrift für Wilhelm G. Grewe, Baden-Baden, 1981, 117–37, here 137.
293. TBJG, II.2, 457 (9 December 1941).
294. Saul Friedländer, Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941, New York, 1967,285.
295. Friedländer, Prelude, 304.
296. Friedländer, Prelude, 304–5.
297. TBJG, II/2, 339 (22 November 1941).
298. Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 126.
299. DGFP, D, 13, 806, N0.487.
300. DGFP, D, 13, 813–14, No.492.
301. IMG, xxxv. 320–23, Doc. D-656; Friedländer, Prelude, 306; Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 127–8. Oshima concluded, from his discussion with Ribbentrop, that ‘there are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary’ (Boyd, 35).
302. Friedländer, Prelude, 306.
303. Staatsmänner I, 256–7 and n.9; and see CP, 436 (20 April 1941). Hitler had commented in May that Japan held the key to the USA (IfZ, ED 100, Hewel diary, entry for 22 May 1941).
304. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler in History, Hanover/London, 1984, 80. In the original German version of the essay, Jäckel dates Ribbentrop’s comment to Oshima to 2 December (‘Kriegserklärung’, 30). Ribbentrop again expressed the willingness of the German government to fight the USA (Boyd, 36).
305. Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 130–31; Domarus, 1788–9.
306. DGFP, D, 13, 958–9, No.546; Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 131–2; Jäckel, Hitler in History, 81.
307. Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 132–4.
308. TBJG, II/2, 346 (22 November 1941). He intended to follow it with a few weeks of recuperation at the Berghof. Given the situation on the eastern front, he evidently abandoned all thoughts of this.
309. TBJG, II/2, 453 (8 December 1941). See Below’s comment, after speaking with Hitler on 9 December: ‘He trusted that America in the foreseeable future, also compelled by the conflict with Japan, would not be able to intervene in the European theatre of war’ (Below, 296).
310. IMG, xxxv.324, DoC.657-D; Friedländer, Prelude, 308.
311. TBJG, II/2, 468 (10 December 1941); 476 (11 December 1941).
312. TBJG, II/2, 476 (11 December 1941).
313. Domarus, 1793; TBJG, II.2, 463 (10 December 1941); Below, 295.
