Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis полностью

146. See Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret. Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s ‘Final Solution, Harmondsworth, 1982, 15n., 17–18; Steinert, 257. Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden, revised trans. edn, Frankfurt am Main, 1990, iii.1283–4, has an unduly complex explanation of the excision of the explicit language by Himmler. The Reichsführer, he suggests, was keen to boast of his ‘achievements’. But he faced a problem. Speer and the Commander of the Reserve Army, General Fritz Fromm, had criticized Himmler and queried with Hitler himself the RSHA’s statistics on arrests of Jews who, they claimed, were needed for the armaments industry. Himmler’s way round his problem was to have a statistical report drawn up for Hitler, but to present it in camouflaged language. Irving, HW, 392, 503–4, 871, takes the view that the Korherr report was doctored to prevent Hitler knowing about the killing operations.

147. See Mommsen, ‘Realisierung’, 414–17.

148. TBJG, II/3, 561 (27 March 1942).

149. In his speech to the Reichs — and Gauleiter after Röver’s death, Hitler indicated that he had little interest in overseas colonies, stating instead: ‘Our colonial territory lies in the East’ (TBJG, II/4, 363 (24 May 1942)).

150. Irving uses this to allege that Hitler did not know of the ‘Final Solution’; see HW, 327 and 850–51 (n. to 326).

151. Laqueur, 18 refers to Himmler’s chief of staff, Karl Wolff, denying in his post-war trial that his boss had ever mentioned mass murder to him. Himmler’s chief adjutant, Werner Grothmann, indicated similarly in an interview long after the war that he had never heard Himmler discuss the ‘Final Solution’ (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Papers, C-58, I/T2/Si/10, taped interview with John Toland, 7 October 1971). Once — if the much later account of a telephonist in Führer Headquarters is to be trusted — the Reichsführer-SS did inadvertently break the code. He was, it was recalled, overheard on the line in mid-May 1942 telling Bormann he had good news for the Führer from Auschwitz that again 20,000 Jews had been ‘liquidated’ there. He immediately corrected the word to ‘evacuated’. But Bormann angrily reminded him that such reports, as arranged, were only to be sent to him by SS courier for passing on to the Führer (Schulz, 98). The veracity of the account is impossible to check. That Hitler was sent frequent reports by SS courier sounds doubtful; as does Himmler’s slip of the tongue. The date, too, seems early, since the routine and systematic mass extermination in Auschwitz only began in July 1942 (Longerich, Politik, 515).

152. Domarus, 1446: ‘Grundsätzlicher Befehl’, 11 January 1940; Laqueur, 18–19. The number of persons with indirect or partial knowledge was of course far wider.

153. This was given as a reason, in autumn 1942, why Gauleiter Greiser should not proceed with his aim to exterminate 30,000 Poles suffering from incurable tuberculosis (Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, 72).

154. See Steinert, 252–7, including (257) reference to Bormann’s secret circular to Gauleiter, informing them on Hitler’s behalf, that ‘in public treatment of the Jewish question all discussion of a future complete solution (Gesamtlösung) must cease. It can however be mentioned that the Jews are conscripted en blsoc for appropriate deployment of labour.’

155. IMG, xxvii.270–73, here 270, Doc. 1517-PS, Alfred Rosenberg: ‘Vermerk über Unterredung beim Führer am 14.12.41’.

156. Steinert, 252–3.

157. IMG, xxix. 145, 1919-PS; Anatomie, i.329; ii.446–7.

158. See Jäckel, ‘Hitler und der Mord an den europäischen Juden’, 161.

159. See note 144 above: BDC, SS-HO, 933: RFSS to Berger, 28 July 1942: ‘Verbot einer Verordnung über den Begriff “Jude”’.

160. See TBJG, II/4, 402 (30 May 1942) for the ‘psychological pressure’ during the winter on account of ‘the unsuccessful Napoleonic adventure’.

161. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 365, 368–9.

162. See TBJG, II/4, 482, 489 (10 June 1942).

163. S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, London, 1954, 1956, 1960, i.599ff., 614, ii.467ff., 475, iii.364ff. See also Overy, Why the Allies Won, 47 (with different figures), 49, 52.

164. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 183; Weinberg III, 350 (who gives the number of British troops captured as 28,000); DRZW, vi.623–33; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.IV, The Hinge of Fate, London etc., 1951, 371–8.

165. Weinberg III, 350–51.

166. Below, 312; Irving, HW, 399; Weinberg III, 350–51.