I Am a Strange Loop полностью

Back in those heady days of my youth, every time I entered a university bookstore (and that was as often as possible), I would instantly swoop down on the mathematics section and scour all the books that had to do with symbolic logic and the nature of symbols and meaning. Thus I bought book after book on these topics, such as Rudolf Carnap’s famous but forbidding The Logical Syntax of Language and Richard Martin’s Truth and Denotation, not to mention countless texts of symbolic logic. Whereas I very carefully read a few such textbooks, the tomes by Carnap and Martin just sat there on my shelf, taunting and teasing me, always seeming just out of reach. They were dense, almost impenetrably so — but I kept on thinking that if only someday, some grand day, I could finally read them and fully fathom them, then at last I would have penetrated to the core of the mysteries of thinking, meaning, creativity, and consciousness. As I look back now, that sounds ridiculously naïve (firstly to imagine this to be an attainable goal, and secondly to believe that those books in particular contained all the secrets), but at the time I was a true believer!

When I was sixteen, I had the unusual experience of teaching symbolic logic at Stanford Elementary School (my own elementary-school alma mater), using a brand-new text by the philosopher and educator Patrick Suppes, who happened to live down the street from our family, and whose classic Introduction to Logic had been one of my most reliable guides. Suppes was conducting an experiment to see if patterns of strict logical inference could be inculcated in children in the same way as arithmetic could, and the school’s principal, who knew me well from my years there, one day bumped into me in the school’s rotunda, and asked me if I would like to teach the sixth-grade class (which included my sister Laura) symbolic logic three times a week for a whole year. I fairly jumped at the chance, and all year long I thoroughly enjoyed it, even if a few of the kids now and then gave me a hard time (rubber bands in the eye, etc.). I taught my class the use of many rules of inference, including the mellifluous modus tollendo tollens and the impressive-sounding “hypothetical syllogism”, and all the while I was honing my skills not only as a novice logician but also as a teacher.

What drove all this — my core inner passion — was a burning desire to see unveiled the secrets of human mentation, to come to understand how it could be that trillions of silent, synchronized scintillations taking place every second inside a human skull enable a person to think, to perceive, to remember, to imagine, to create, and to feel. At more or less the same time, I was reading books on the brain, studying several foreign languages, exploring exotic writing systems from various countries, inventing ways to get a computer to generate grammatically complicated and quasi-coherent sentences in English and in other languages, and taking a marvelously stimulating psychology course. All these diverse paths were focused on the dense nebula of questions about the relationship between mind and mechanism, between mentality and mechanicity.

Intricately woven together, then, in my adolescent mind were the study of pattern (mathematics) and the study of paradoxes (metamathematics). I was somehow convinced that all the mysterious secrets with which I was obsessed would become crystal-clear to me once I had deeply mastered these two intertwined disciplines. Although over the course of the next couple of decades I lost essentially all of my faith in the notion that these disciplines contained (even implicitly) the answers to all these questions, one thing I never lost was my intuitive hunch that around the core of the eternal riddle “What am I?”, there swirled the ethereal vortex of Gödel’s elaborately constructed loop.

It is for that reason that in this book, although I am being driven principally by questions about consciousness and self, I will have to devote some pages to the background needed for a (very rough) understanding of Gödel’s ideas — and in particular, this means number theory and logic. There won’t be heavy doses of either one, to be sure, but I do have to paint at least a coarse-grained picture of what these fields are basically about; otherwise, we won’t have any way to proceed. So please fasten your seat belt, dear reader. We’re going to be experiencing a bit of weather for the next two chapters.

Post Scriptum