Gierek entertained ambitious plans for an ‘economic leap forward’, to be achieved by massive borrowing from the West which was to be repaid through the improved extraction of raw materials and the export of goods produced in new factories built with foreign capital. The spirit of
Initial results were dramatic: production rose sharply and the Polish economy began to grow at a faster rate than any other bar Japan’s. New roads were built, railways were modernised and modern apartment blocks sprang up around every city. The standard of living went up, and its cost went down. Private cars, dishwashers and trips abroad came within the reach of the average citizen. Gierek was out to buy popularity, so the peasants were relieved of the compulsory delivery quotas, and national insurance was extended to cover them. The price of food was frozen at the 1965 level in order to win the hearts of the workers.
It was not long before cracks began to appear in Gierek’s economic structure. The new factories were finished behind schedule, while their products proved to be of inferior quality and difficult to sell in the West. The foreign debt spiralled. The only answer was to increase exports of coal and other raw materials, and to divert consumer goods originally intended for the home market to exports. The consequences were felt immediately, through shortages of staple items. As Gierek juggled with figures, he forgot the lessons of history. In 1975 he raised the prices of ‘luxury’ consumer goods, and on 24 June 1976 the price of food by an average of 60 per cent. On the following day strikes broke out in Radom, Warsaw and around the country. The price rises were quickly withdrawn, but the motorised detachments of the Citizens’ Militia (ZOMO) went into action, arresting and beating the striking workers. People were dismissed from their jobs by the hundred, and sentences of up to ten years were handed out.
The crisis brought to the surface a basketful of problems which had been obscured by Gierek’s economic fireworks. His plans were based on an assumption of technical competence on the part of the Party cadres, but while membership had risen to a record three million, quality had not. The new men lacked the commitment to socialist ideals of those they replaced, and brought neither a sense of realism nor managerial ability in its stead. Rather than curing the ills endemic to socialist economies, they added to them, as corruption came in on the tail of incompetence. It was corruption on a vast scale, spreading through every branch of the system in the most flagrant manner, giving birth to a vast kleptocracy that bred resentment throughout society.
Gierek had leapt at every opportunity of credit and cooperation offered by the spirit of
The Soviets wanted tangible tribute, in the form of a series of amendments to the Polish constitution. Poland was to be constitutionally committed to socialism, to the ‘leading role’ of the Party and, most important, to a ‘fraternal alliance’ with the Soviet Union. In addition to being larded with references to the Great October Revolution (which had brought the Bolsheviks to power in Russia in 1917), the constitution was also to contain an insidious clause which made civil rights dependent on ‘the fulfilment of civic duty’, but this was dropped as a result of public protest and the vehement intervention of the Church.
The breadth of the public response and the fact that Gierek felt obliged to give in were twin symptoms of a radically altered relationship between Poland’s government and its people. It was not that the authorities had grown soft or neglected their defences—the budget of the Interior Ministry remained larger than those of the ministries of culture, health and education put together. It was simply that society had grown more assertive and politically more mature.