A new government had been formed in 1985 under the economist Zbigniew Messner, a man with a low Party profile, but his efforts at curing the country’s economic ills got nowhere. By 1987 the foreign debt had gone up to $37.6 billion. A mood of despondency enveloped the country, and a vast economic migration of three-quarters of a million joined the political refugees. The state of health of the nation reached alarming levels, and population growth halved over the period 1980-89. People took to blackmarketeering and petty trading on a gigantic scale for survival. Ironically, the near-collapse of the economy stimulated the growth of small private enterprises, which by the end of the decade accounted for over 20 per cent of GDP.
Although still outlawed, Solidarność continued to exist as a force. Its old leadership had come together and, under the influence of moderates such as Kuroń and Michnik, issued repeated calls for dialogue, calls which were supported by the Church and by foreign governments. But it also occasionally showed its teeth. When price rises were announced in 1986, it threatened a nationwide strike, and the proposals were withdrawn. Jaruzelski’s attempt to ignore the movement’s existence was beginning to look foolish. Every foreign statesman visiting Poland, including US Vice President George Bush, trod the path to Wałęsa’s home and consulted him on whether or not to ease sanctions.
The Pope’s third visit to his native land, in June 1987, was almost as important as his first, and it was by far the most political. The militia were unable to prevent a sea of Solidarność placards waving above the heads of the crowds at his open-air masses, which were televised and watched by the whole nation. The Pope talked to Wałęsa and had several discussions with a more attentive Jaruzelski. But the General still baulked at the idea of talking to Wałęsa. Instead, he attempted to engage Polish society on his own terms, by holding a referendum on proposed economic initiatives, which was a failure, and announcing, in October 1987, the formation of a new Consultative Council.
Wałęsa had pre-empted him by setting up, in September of the same year, an Interim Council, with regional committees, to formulate a new consensus, and Bronisław Geremek suggested dialogue with reform-minded members of the Party.
The volume of public protest was rising steadily, and a new generation of activists within Solidarność pressed for more determined action. Austerity measures introduced in February 1988 provoked widespread strikes, which were put down with the use of force. In response, Solidarność threatened Jaruzelski with a general strike to take place on 1 September.
On 26 August General Kiszczak announced that he had been authorised to hold consultative talks with opposition groups. A meeting with Wałęsa and Bishop Dąbrowski took place five days later, and it was agreed that ’round table’ talks would be held in October. Wałęsa called off the strikes. A new government was formed under Mieczysław Rakowski including a few independent figures, and preparatory talks began.
But while the round table was ready by the prescribed date, the talks did not start. There was disagreement about who should take part and about the scope of the talks. Wałęsa and the Church representatives wanted them to cover not only economic issues, but constitutional ones as well. Fresh dates were set and then cancelled as the two sides argued over procedure and the issues at stake, but the talks did finally begin, on 6 February 1989. Fifty-seven people convened at the round table, presided over by Kiszczak, with many more meeting in subcommittees dealing with subjects such as the economy, agriculture, political reform and so on. At the opening session, Kiszczak announced that the final goal of the talks was to bring about ’non-confrontational elections’, which raised many questions. In private, he was heard to comment that he and his comrades were putting a noose around their own necks.
The Party may have been in disarray, but its two million members included the security services and most of the army, and there were plenty who would be prepared to fight for their positions. And for all his liberal talk, nobody could be sure how Gorbachev would react to fundamental change in Poland, the cornerstone of Soviet Russia’s military system. The opposition negotiators therefore trod warily, allowing generous terms for the capitulation of the nomenklatura.
The talks ended on 5 April, in a spirit of unexpectedly harmonious agreement. Solidarity and the Church recovered their legal status, the right of free association and freedom of speech were guaranteed, as was the independence of the judiciary. Most important were the constitutional changes: the office of president was revived and a bicameral parliament was established. Elections were to be held in June.