A real sense of crisis could be felt during the run-up, and for the first time since 1989 a large number of younger voters took the trouble to take part. The result was a resounding victory for Donald Tusk’s Citizens’ Platform, which took over 41 per cent of the vote, and PiS, which, although it was knocked into second place, increased its share of the vote to over 32 per cent, while the left scraped just over 13 and the People’s Party less than 9. Lepper’s Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families, with just over 1 per cent each, failed to reach the threshold for representation.
These elections represent something of a watershed in the history of the Third Republic. The hundred-plus parties which had contested the elections of 1991 had been reduced over the intervening years to no more than half a dozen, the dozens represented in the Sejm to no more than four. The demagogues, single-issue politicians and post-communists who had preyed on an inexperienced electorate had finally been voted out of the picture. At no stage during that time was the democratic process ever questioned, even by extremists, and the process of parliamentary democracy had firmly established itself at the centre of Polish life in a way it had not in the 1920s. Yet serious flaws can be detected in the mechanisms of Poland’s democracy, most of them inherent in its origins.
In Poland, democracy was not imposed on a neutral country; it was won by the efforts of the oppositionists of 1947, the striking workers of Poznań in 1956, the students of 1968, the dockyard workers of 1970, the Radom workers of 1976, by the activists of KIK, KOR, ROPCiO, by Solidarność and all those, inside the country and out, who struggled for the overthrow of Soviet domination. They included left-wing workers who were traditionalist Catholics, right-wing but populist and egalitarian peasants, intellectuals of every orientation, and traditional middle-class conservatives. Most of them had been conditioned by the communist world in which they had been brought up to reject such fundamentals of democracy as property rights, the rule of law and personal answerability. That upbringing had also inspired in them a subversive attitude to the state and all organs of authority.
While the political class that emerged triumphant in 1989 represented a wide spectrum of opinion and beliefs, it thought of itself as being on the ’right’, since it had fought against the communists, and believed itself to be united because it had stood shoulder to shoulder against them. The run-up to the first free elections in 1991 shattered this fictitious political unity and sense of solidarity as over a hundred parties joined the campaign. These were not based on coherent political manifestos; they were merely groups of like-minded people focused on personalities or single issues.
The political thinking and strategies of the post-Solidarność camp had been forged in protest and subversion, which they had underpinned with moral arguments. Those arguments became irrelevant when the oppressive regime had been overthrown and the time came to build a new Poland, and they did not have any ready substitutes. As they struggled to reposition themselves in the new reality, the various leaders became locked in an acerbic debate on what kind of Poland they should rebuild, conducted in moral, and therefore often extremist terms. This, as well as their subversive skills, invalidated them as politicians.
By contrast, the post-communists were pragmatic and efficient. They were not communists, not even socialists by conviction; they had joined the Party for opportunistic career reasons and been groomed to govern. Just as they were about to inherit the kingdom, in the late 1980s, it fell apart, leaving them stranded. With their managerial training and some experience of power, they were a natural governing class; their sense of discipline, connections and access to cash allowed them to form a successful political force.
All this created misunderstandings and contradictions. Supposedly right-wing governments carried through social-democratic programmes, thereby alienating not only their coalition partners but also their constituencies. As no genuine left-wing party emerged, those who would naturally vote socialist were confused, and often found themselves supporting parties which enacted capitalist policies. The post-communist SLD favoured the free market and was supported by middle-class conservatives who wanted order and stability. The ostensibly far-right PiS was supported by the poor, whom it seduced by its nationalistic, populist and socialist slogans.