Much has been written about the origins of the Cold War. In September 1944—only three months after the Allied invasion in Normandy and eight months before the capture of Berlin by the Red Army—the American diplomat and Kremlin watcher George Kennan predicted with great foresight not only the advent of the East-West conflict, but he also indicated its origin. Writing about “the Russian aims in Eastern and Central Europe,” Kennan wrote: “Russian efforts in this area are directed to only one goal: power. The form this power takes, the methods by which it is achieved: these are secondary questions.”[1] And he continued:
For the smaller countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the issue is not one of communism or capitalism. It is one of the independence of national life or of domination by a big power which has never shown itself adept at making any permanent compromises with rival power groups. . . . Today, in the autumn of 1944, the Kremlin finds itself committed by its own inclination to the concrete task of becoming the dominant power of Eastern and Central Europe. At the same time, it also finds itself committed by past promises and by world opinion to a vague program which Western statesmen—always so fond of quaint terms agreeable to their electorates—call collaboration. The first of these programs implies taking. The second implies giving. No one can stop Russia from doing the taking, if she is determined to go through with it. No one can force Russia to do the giving, if she is determined not to go through with it. In these circumstances others may worry.[2]
That there were, indeed, reasons to worry would soon become clear when Stalin’s Soviet
Russia began to install grim communist dictatorships in the countries that fell into
its sphere of influence. In July 1947, eight months before the communist coup d’état
in Prague, George Kennan published in
The War in Afghanistan: Andropov’s War?
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, this was interpreted by
the West as a new phase of Soviet imperialist expansion. It was considered a war of
conquest with the aim to add new territory to the Soviet bloc. But, with hindsight,
things were more complicated. Initially, there was not so much a