Hans Crooijmans, the Moscow correspondent of the Dutch weekly Elsevier, for instance, four days after the ceasefire published an article titled “Reckless
Violence.” The word “reckless” referred not to the Russians, but to Saakashvili, who
was believed to have started the war regardless of the consequences. “What incited
the political leaders of Georgia to attack exactly on August 8, Tskinhvali, the capital
of South Ossetia,” wrote Crooijmans, “we cannot be sure.” And he continued, “As could
be expected the Russians came to the rescue of the South Ossetians.” (Hans Crooijmans,
“Onbesuisd geweld,” Elsevier (August 16, 2008).)
3.
Pavel K. Baev, “Russian “Tandemocracy” Stumbles into War,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 5, no. 153 (August 11, 2008).
4.
Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard, and Andrew Wilson, “Can the EU Win the Peace in Georgia?”
Policy Brief (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), 3 (emphasis mine).
5.
Cf. Thornike Gordadze, “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, eds. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2009),
37. Shevardnadze reported Grachev’s assertion in an interview, published in the Russian
magazine Argumenty i Fakty on July 2, 2005. In a report of the International Crisis Group even the separatist
Abkhaz authorities expressed a certain distrust vis-à-vis Moscow’s intentions. According
to the report they believed that Moscow “is more interested in its territory than
its people. The Abkhaz de facto leader, Bagapsh, said, ‘Russia is interested in access to the sea, of which our territory
offers 240 km.’” (“Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia,” Europe Report No.
193, International Crisis Group, June 5, 2008, 3.)
6.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March-April 1994), 73–74.
7.
Cf. Andrey Illarionov, “Another Look at the August War,” Center for Eurasian Policy,
Hudson Institute, Washington (September 12, 2008), 7.
8.
Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West, 73. The Abkhaz and South Ossetian holders of Russian passports enjoyed complete
Russian citizen rights. In December 2007 they voted in the Duma elections and in March
2008 in the presidential elections of the Russian Federation. (Cf. Marie Jégo, “’L’indépendance’,
et après?” Le Monde (August 28, 2008).)
9.
Asmus, A Little War, 42.
10.
Janusz Bugajski, “Russia’s Soft Power Wars,” The Ukrainian Week (February 8, 2013).
11.
Cf. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Volume II (September 2009), 182. http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf.
12.
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 147. In October 2009 the Abkhaz Ministry of the Interior announced that between
2006 and 2009 141,245 of the 180,000–200,000 inhabitants of Abkhazia had received
Abkhaz passports. On the basis of the data given in 2006 this would mean that almost
all Abkhaz passport holders also had a Russian passport. (Quoted in Sabine Fischer,
“Abkhazia and the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict: Autumn 2009,” ISS Analysis, EU Institute
for Security Studies (December 2009), 3.)
13.
The passports in Abkhazia were issued on the basis of the Law on Citizenship of the
Republic of Abkhazia of October 24, 2005. Article 6 of this Law stipulated “that a
citizen of the Republic of Abkhazia is also entitled to obtain the citizenship of
the Russian Federation.” The South Ossetian de facto Constitution of April 8, 2001, stipulated “(1) The Republic of South Ossetia shall
have its own citizenship. (2) Double-citizenship is admissible in the Republic of
South Ossetia.” (Cf. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 163.)
14.
