Andrey Illarionov provided a small list of Russians in the government of South Ossetia. They included lieutenant-general Anatoly Barankevich, minister of defense from July 6, 2004, to December 10, 2006; Anatoly Yarovoy, FSB major-general, chairman of the KGB in South Ossetia from January 17, 2005, to March 2, 2006; Mikhail Mindzayev, FSB lieutenant-general, minister of the interior of South Ossetia from April 26, 2005, to August 18, 2008; Andrey Laptev, lieutenant-general, minister of defense of South Ossetia from December 11, 2006, to February 28, 2008; Aslanbek Bulatsev, FSB colonel, prime minister of South Ossetia since October 31, 2008 (Illarionov, “The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1999–2008,” 81–82).
33.
Alexander Golts, “Opyat Kavkazskaya Voyna,”
34.
Illarionov, “The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1999–2008,” 68.
35.
Mart Laar, “Echoes of the 1930s in Russia’s Sweeping Annexation,”
36.
“Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia,” 4.
37.
Cf. “Kommentary Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s voprosami SMI otnositelno intsidenta s gruzinskim bespilotnym samoletom 20 aprelya 2008 goda” (Comment of the Information and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry of Russia concerning questions from the media on the incident with the Georgian drone on April 20, 2008). Website of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
38.
Yuliya Latynina, “200 km. tankov. O rossiysko: gruzinskoy voyne” (Two Hundred Kilometres
of Tanks. On the Russian-Georgian War),
39.
Cf. Neil Buckley and Roman Olearchyk, “UN Says Moscow Shot Georgian Drone,”
40.
Pavel Felgenhauer, “Saakashvili Wants to Get to Moscow, While Russian Troops Are in
Abkhazia Already,”
41.
Felgenhauer, “Saakashvili Wants to Get to Moscow, While Russian Troops Are in Abkhazia Already.”
42.
“NATO calls on Russia to withdraw railway troops from Georgia,”
43.
“Saakashvili Calls Security Council to Decide on Abkhazia,”
44.
“Tbilisi Condemns Russian ’Railway Troops’ in Abkhazia,”
45.
Socor, “The Goals Behind Moscow’s Proxy Offensive in South Ossetia.”
46.
“Rossiya stoit na grani bolshoy Kavkazkoy voyny,”
47.
“Rossiya stoit na grani bolshoy Kavkazkoy voyny.”
48.
“58-ay armiya RF gotova voyti v Tskhinvali,”
49.
“58-ay armiya RF gotova voyti v Tskhinvali.”
50.
The War with Georgia, Part II
Different authors have tried to reconstruct the chain of events leading to the outbreak of war. In this chain of events there are at least six events that should be considered. They are, separately, and taken together, a clear indication of Russia’s preparations for war. These events are as follows:
A cyber war, launched by Russian servers before the outbreak of the hostilities, paralyzing Georgian government websites. This cyber war must have been prepared well in advance.
