Asia. A pact with Germany would almost automatically end the war with Japan, Hitler's ally.
Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow and the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23 came almost as a complete surprise to the Russian public, and if nobody openly declared himself deeply shocked and scandalised, it was simply because it was
"not done"—especially after the Purge years—to be openly shocked or scandalised by anything with which Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov were directly associated. It
is, nevertheless, obvious that, at heart, millions of Russians were deeply perplexed by what had happened, after their country had been in the vanguard of the "anti-Fascist struggle" ever since the Nazis had come to power.
[This is also confirmed by the recollections of so competent an observer as Wolfgang Leonhard, whose account is based on firsthand experience at the time within the
Comintern establishment:
also widespread chuckling among many Russians about the punishment meted out to
England and France "after all their dirty tricks".]
The mental alibis to which many Russians—whether workers or intellectuals—resorted,
at least during the early stages of the Pact, were that Stalin and Molotov no doubt knew what they were doing; that they had, after all, kept the Soviet Union out of war (here was something corresponding roughly to the "cowardly relief and shame" reaction in the West at the time of Munich); and that the Pact, though distasteful, had been rendered inevitable by the attitude of France, Britain and Poland. Nor was it doubted that Stalin and Molotov must have had a great many reservations about the whole thing.
The reactions to the "deal" with Hitler were to undergo numerous changes during the twenty-two months the Pact was in force; but it seems clear that Stalin and Molotov were fully conscious of the mixed feelings with which the Pact was received in the country.
Throughout the Pact period, the Soviet press, for example, maintained a marked
aloofness
communiqués and some official utterances by Hitler, especially when these concerned
Soviet-German relations. Important news items, such as Stalin's toast during Ribbentrop's visit—"Since the German people love their Führer so much, let us drink the Führer's health"—were carefully kept out of the Russian press.
During the week preceding Ribbentrop's visit, Aviation Day had been celebrated on
August 18, and half the front page of
profound knowledge in aviation matters", and recalled some of the outstanding feats of Soviet aviation in recent years and their heroes—Chkalov, Gromov, Grizodubova,
Raskova and Osipenko. The same paper reported, on its foreign news page, "Jewish pogroms in Czechoslovakia" (TASS, Prague), and "Persecution of Poles in Germany"
(TASS, Warsaw).
On August 19,
Shvernik, Malenkov, Bulganin, Shcherbakov, Shkiriatov, Budienny, Loktionov and
Mikhailov. On August 20 the place of honour was given to a "Letter from Prague", entitled: "The Czech People are Not Defeated." And then, on August 21, there appeared, as we have seen, the famous editorial on the Soviet-German Trade and Credit Agreement, with its significant concluding paragraph, foreshadowing a political
But on the following two days—August 22 and 23—there was still nothing of any
importance, except the usual seemingly anti-German news items like these: "Many Poles preparing to flee from Danzig", or "Mass Arrests in Memel. Gestapo arresting not only Poles, but also Lithuanians, Polish Press says."
On August 24 came the bombshell. Big front-page pictures in
