World history had never before seen such carnage by a regime against itself, as well as its own people—not in the French Revolution, not under Italian fascism or Nazism. Although it was clear to no one at the time, the future bloodbath was latent in Stalin’s policy battles with what he called the right deviation in 1928 and especially 1929, when he took evident pleasure in humiliating Bukharin. It was also manifest in Stalin’s toying with the arrest of Tukhachevsky in 1930, and propelled by the opposition in the party during collectivization and the famine in 1932. It was facilitated by Stalin’s promotion of Yezhov inside the party apparatus, to oversee the NKVD and the reopening of the Kirov assassination case in 1935, followed by arrest waves of Trotskyites in late 1935 and early 1936.318 Unsatisfied with the convictions of Zinoviev and Kamenev for creating a “moral atmosphere” conducive to Kirov’s murder, Stalin had insisted that they be directly implicated in the actual deed, and that Trotsky, in foreign exile, be directly implicated, too. From here it was a short step to the incited public hysteria of the first Moscow showcase trial, staged in August 1936, of Zinovievites and Trotskyites, which fixated on a meeting in 1932 when the two tiny, pathetic groupings had attempted to coordinate, and resulted in the executions of Zinoviev and Kamenev.
Stalin drove the process with his desire to break psychologically the loyalists in his inner circle, above all Orjonikidze but also Kaganovich and Voroshilov, and he further intensified it with his desire to counter Trotsky’s condemnatory writings about his betrayal of the revolution and interdict the possibility of a Trotskyite beachhead in Spain under a dissident (non-Stalinist) Marxist party, the POUM, some of whose members had once been associated with Trotsky or continued to admire him. A second trial of “Trotskyites,” in January 1937, was followed by Orjonikidze’s suicide and an unprecedented eleven-day February–March 1937 Central Committee plenum, which included fatal smearing of Bukharin and Yagoda and Stalin’s threat to replace sitting elites wholesale; an early June 1937 special session of the Main Military Council and a mid-June in-camera trial resulting in executions of Tukhachevsky and the military brass; a late June 1937 party plenum outlining a phantasmagorical “Center of Centers”; the launching, in July–August 1937, of “mass operations” with ever-expanding quotas; the annihilation of republic and provincial party machines, of the Comintern, foreign affairs commissariat, foreign intelligence, and military intelligence; the disruption of the industrial economy, including military industry; the August 1937 coup-rampage in Mongolia; some forty provincial showcase trials, mostly in fall 1937, ordered up by central directive; a January 1938 plenum’s concessions to party wailings about NKVD savagery, accompanied by extensions of the mass operations. The third Moscow trial, in March 1938, seemed to mark a public culmination of sorts, but the carnage was far from over.
Mass terror by the regime against its own elites and masses, like collectivization, was both an inherent possibility within the Bolshevik revolutionary project and a choice Stalin alone made—and saw through. Collectivization (a violent conscription of the peasantry to serve the state) and its attendant horrors were necessary to consolidate the Bolshevik project of a political monopoly hell-bent on a noncapitalist modernity (collectivization would not be repudiated after Stalin’s death). The mass terror constituted a gratuitous infliction of phenomenal violence, although for Stalin, in many ways, the party’s recoil at the costs of collectivization precipitated his terror. The best indication that the terror inhered in Bolshevism was the relative ease with which Stalin could foist the bloodbath upon the political police, army, party-state, cultural elites, and indeed the entire country. The best indication of his singular role in doing so was the fact that it blindsided even his intimates. Molotov, no softie, did not see the