The defense commissar insisted on direct confirmation from the Poles and the Romanians. At a break in the talks, Doumenc took it upon himself to send his own envoy to Warsaw to arrange Polish agreement for Soviet passage through its territory.93 On August 13, with the Nazis openly threatening Danzig, Poland had ordered a partial mobilization of its army. Two days later, the Poles publicly celebrated the nineteenth anniversary of the “miracle on the Vistula,” in which they had driven back the Red Army. In response to French inquiries about granting Red Army transit, Warsaw refused again. Soviet “assistance,” many Poles felt, would be worse than facing the Nazis. “An intelligent rabbit,” Halifax had written of the Poles, “would hardly be expected to welcome the protection of an animal ten times its size, whom it credited with the habits of a boa constrictor.”94 But Halifax, just like the Polish government, failed to grasp that refusing the Soviets would mean facing
Voroshilov initiated a pointed discussion of each side’s common-defense contributions to a prospective anti-German military alliance. Shaposhnikov outlined a massive Soviet commitment of up to 120 infantry divisions, as well as 16 cavalry divisions, 5,000 heavy artillery pieces, 9,500 tanks, and as many as 5,500 fighter aircraft and bombers. This amounted to more than a million-man force, to be fielded immediately if necessary. The French claimed to have 110 available combat divisions. The British, reluctant to divulge “military secrets,” finally stated that they could commit 16 army divisions. So few? Pressed, the British admitted that the real number was perhaps 5.95 (In fact, it was probably 2.) The Soviets, as a land power, had difficulty grasping the full measure of British strength, which was in the air and, especially, on the sea.96 Be that as it may, by forcing such a conversation, one of Voroshilov’s interpreters surmised, the defense commissar had deliberately been seeking to humiliate the Anglo-French military men.97 Fair enough. But could Stalin be faulted? As far as London was concerned, the real action was in Berlin, where the British had even let on that they did not take seriously their own negotiations with Moscow.98
THE HITLER CARD
The Soviets, on August 12, 1939, agreed to the German foreign ministry’s proposal for political talks, requesting, however, that they take place in Moscow. Hitler contemplated dispatching his personal lawyer and minister without portfolio Hans Frank (who had previously gone to Rome to finalize the Axis accord), but on August 14 he opted to send Ribbentrop, a move that Schulenburg formally proposed to Molotov the next day.99 That night, at around 8:00 p.m., with Drax in Moscow, Molotov received Schulenburg, who read out a statement received that morning from Ribbentrop. “Germany has no aggressive intentions against the USSR,” Schulenburg stated. “The Reich government is of the opinion that there is no question between the Baltic and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea, the Baltic area, Poland, Southeast questions, etc.” The ambassador proposed a lightning visit by Ribbentrop to Moscow to “set forth the Führer’s views to M. Stalin.” Molotov inquired about a possible bilateral nonaggression pact and German mediation of Soviet-Japanese relations, but said that “such a trip required adequate preparation.”100 To increase the pressure on Berlin, the day before (and again two days after), Stalin had the German embassy in London informed that the Anglo-Soviet talks were proceeding smoothly and that the Poles would open staff talks with the Soviets.101
On August 16, Rudolf Herrnstadt, a Soviet spy handler in Warsaw, reported to military intelligence HQ in Moscow that the embassy spy Scheliha had revealed that the German invasion of Poland would commence very soon.102 On August 17, Molotov again received Schulenburg and reported a favorable reaction on the part of “the Soviet government,” but insisted first on the signing of an economic agreement, after which the Soviets wanted to see a written proposal for a nonaggression pact, and only then, about a week after the conclusion of an economic agreement, could Ribbentrop’s visit take place. The Nazi foreign minister, once apprised, on August 18–19 sent Schulenburg a brief two-article text of a nonaggression pact of twenty-five years’ duration, with details to be ironed out in person, promising a special protocol on the Baltic area. “You must keep in mind the decisive fact that an early outbreak of open German-Polish conflict is probable,” Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg, “and that we therefore have the greatest interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately.”103