Stalin полностью

Stalin’s response, transmitted via the German embassy, arrived in Berlin at 8:30 p.m. local time on August 21. At the Berghof, champagne was ordered. Hitler, a teetotaler, did not imbibe, but he drummed both fists on the wall.¹¹² Just before midnight, the Nazi regime released the sensational news of its foreign minister’s upcoming Moscow visit. In Paris, the government pondered pressing the Poles into “compromise” with Hitler, to buy time. In London, the assembled cabinet sought to appear nonchalant, but MPs were asking about the apparent failure of British intelligence to anticipate such a shocking turn of events.¹¹³ Burgess informed Gorsky of a telegram from Ambassador Henderson, also on August 21: “All measures have been taken for Hermann Göring to arrive under secret cover in London on Wednesday 23rd. This will amount to a historic event and we are just waiting for confirmation of this from the German side.”¹¹⁴

At the Berghof, very early on the morning of Saturday, August 22, the Führer addressed his top brass. He had summoned them to discuss his plans for Poland even before the news had come from Moscow, with instructions to arrive in civilian attire so as not to give anything away. “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later,” he began, according to notes taken by Wilhelm Canaris, the head of military intelligence. “I had already made this decision in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only after that against the East.” But the Polish situation had become “intolerable.” His only fear, he said, was “that at the last minute some Schweinhund will make a proposal for mediation.” He concluded with an injunction about the absolute necessity of taking advantage of his never-to-be-repeated spell over the German people. “Essentially,” Hitler said, leaning on a grand piano, “all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents.” He adjourned them for lunch. To allay worries over his precipitating a new world war, he decided to address them a second time, giving some operational details and asserting that England had no real military. Not a single top general voiced objections. Toward the end of his peroration, Hitler briefly broke off, suddenly recognized Ribbentrop from among those assembled, and, melodramatically, sent his foreign minister with a Nazi salute right from the Berghof to fly to Stalin.¹¹⁵

That same Saturday, August 22, following the emergency cabinet meeting, Henderson set out to hand-deliver Chamberlain’s latest telegram to Hitler. Received at the Berghof on August 23 at 1:00 p.m., he stated that any German-Soviet pact would not alter Britain’s obligations to Poland, but hinted again that Britain could trade Poland away, and suggested again that the very next day, Field Marshal Göring should fly to Britain surreptitiously to meet Chamberlain at Chequers, the prime minister’s country residence, to hammer out an Anglo-German accord. Ever the ingrate, Hitler berated Henderson, shouting that London’s “blank check” guarantee to Poland had ruled out negotiations. Henderson departed, then was called back, but Hitler, although calmer, blamed Britain for being “determined to destroy and exterminate Germany.” The Führer evidently felt that his theatrics, on top of any pact with Stalin, would induce the British and, in their train, the French to back down from their pledges to Poland. After Henderson departed a second time, Hitler slapped his thigh in self-congratulation at his performance. “Chamberlain won’t survive this discussion,” he said. “His cabinet will fall this evening.”¹¹⁶

Chamberlain had done more for the Nazi leader than any other foreign politician, and the British PM appeared ready to do even more, in order to avoid war over Poland—but the game was up. In the extended diplomatic three-card monte, after all the dealing and double-dealing, Stalin, not Chamberlain, had turned up the “Hitler” card.

Even as Henderson was en route to the Berghof, Nikita Khrushchev arrived at the Near Dacha, having flown in from Kiev, where he was party boss. Few Moscow party officials, let alone “provincials,” enjoyed such access to the despot’s residence. Stalin let on that Ribbentrop was flying in to Moscow the next day, then looked at his protégé and smiled. Assuming that Stalin’s twisted sense of humor was at work yet again, Khrushchev played along, asking if Ribbentrop was going to defect. Stalin replied that he had gotten a telegram from Hitler.¹¹⁷

WINDFALL