Paasikivi, his passage slowed by Finnish troop movements (the reserves had been ordered into training), arrived back in Moscow on October 23 for a second round of talks. He had in tow the Social Democrat Tanner, who it was believed would stand firm against the Communists.64 In fact, while this representative of the “Finnish working class” evoked mistrust in Moscow, because he came from the Communists’ despised rivals on the left, the representative of the big bourgeoisie, Paasikivi, was regarded as a trustworthy partner and proponent of good relations. The intensive consultations in Helsinki had led to the conclusion that Stalin had staked out an absurdly maximalist price, from which he was prepared to come way down to close a deal. The Finnish government, very reluctantly, had come around to the possibility of moving the border westward on the Karelian Isthmus, but only about eight miles from Leningrad. And Helsinki held fast to its condition that no territory could be leased to the USSR for military purposes.65
At the next negotiating session, that very evening of October 23, Stalin was again present. The Finns read out a statement on behalf of their government and agreed to offer some islands in the Gulf of Finland that had not been requested by the Soviets, as well as to discuss Suursaari (Hogland). Stalin pointed out to the returning Finnish delegation that his original proposal—the Hanko Cape, the western Rybachy Peninsula near Petsamo in the north, the Karelian Isthmus—had been his indispensable minimum. Still, the despot, who showed himself extremely well versed in the geographical details, did soften his territorial demands, seizing a pencil and drawing a new line across the Karelian Isthmus on a general staff map. It ran slightly south of the border he had first named. That, Stalin concluded, was the best he could do. Two hours of mostly fruitless exchanges ensued, until the Finnish delegation decided to take their leave. “Is it your intention to provoke a conflict?” a surprised Molotov asked. Stalin smiled enigmatically.66
The Finns were in the process of preparing to book the next train back to Helsinki when the phone rang, summoning them back to the Kremlin—a sign either of a Soviet ultimatum or, the Finns hoped, of Stalin’s climbdown. At 11:00 p.m., Molotov opened by reading a formal memorandum that contained a precise formulation of the new line Stalin had hand drawn. It did, however, contain still more concessions: the strength of a Soviet garrison at Hanko would be not 5,000, but 4,000, and the length of the lease would be altered from thirty years to the date on which the current war in Europe ended.67 As Stalin knew, the British held Gibraltar, on the Spanish coast at the entrance to the Mediterranean, indefinitely. Again, however, the Finns declared that they needed to consult at home. They departed by train on October 24.68 By now, Finland’s mobilization was complete: all men ages twenty-two to forty for the army, and up to age fifty for the auxiliary Schutz Corps—more than a quarter million total. Beria reported to Stalin that Tanner, on October 26, had told the Social Democratic faction in Helsinki that “the situation is entirely critical” and that further military mobilization would be necessary.69
Soviet forces deployed to the new bases in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were issued strict orders not to interfere in domestic affairs.70 “During the first imperialist war, the Bolsheviks overestimated the situation,” Stalin explained to Zhdanov and Dimitrov (October 25), an implicit criticism of Lenin. “The masses must be led to revolution gradually! Slogans must be brought out that will help the masses break with Social D[emocratic] leaders!” He concluded: “We believe that in our pacts of mutual assistance (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) we have found the right form to allow us to bring a number of countries into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. But for that we must wait, strictly observe their internal regimes and independence. We shall not push for their Sovietization. The time will come when they will do that themselves!”71