Stalin полностью

Hitler, from the start, had wanted all of Czechoslovakia—and more—which contemporaries had failed to grasp. They also failed to understand that Stalin was a revolutionary imperialist with limits. He had suppressed not only the genuine, bottom-up collectivization by anarchists in Spain, but also a Communist putsch there, and he pushed back strongly against the revolutionary impulses of the Communists in China. Regarding Finland, too, in his own way, he was showing a sense of limits. Paasikivi, during this latest negotiating pause, telegrammed Helsinki to ask if he could offer the island of Jussarö, in the west, and the fort of Ino (on Cape Inoniemi), in the east (opposite Kronstadt), suggesting that with these concessions, more favorable terms might be reached on Soviet demands for the Karelian Isthmus and near Petsamo, in the far north. But at this decisive phase, the Finnish government took Stalin’s last-minute concessions, which aimed to close a deal, as evidence that he would soften still more, and might be bluffing altogether. On the morning of November 8, Helsinki telegrammed instructions—as inflexible as ever. Paasikivi, attempting to acquire some authority to cut a deal, wrote back, “Instructions received. If no agreement on this basis, may we let the negotiations be broken off?” Erkko did not take the bait.⁸⁶

That day, the Soviets were still recuperating from the holiday, according to Tanner. On November 9, Molotov had the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Helsinki, the undercover NKVD operative Yelisei Sinitsyn, whose intelligence experience dated back just a few months to Soviet-conquered Lwów/Lvov, call on Erkko. Sinitsyn emphasized the differences between tsarist and Soviet treatment of Finland, but Erkko would not budge.⁸⁷ That same evening, the Finns were in Molotov’s office, again with Stalin present. Paasikivi read out the Finnish government reply to Stalin’s proposal for just the three islands east of Hanko Cape: negative. “The eyes of our opposite numbers opened wide,” Tanner later wrote. “It was clear that they had expected us to assent gladly to this suggestion.” Paasikivi brought out a chart and proposed to offer the southern part of Suursaari (Hogland) Island. He tried to get Stalin to abandon demands for any territory in western Finland (nearer the entrance to the gulf) and focus solely on eastern Finland (nearer Leningrad). Stalin: “You don’t even offer Ino?”⁸⁸

The Finns took their leave. Stalin retreated to the Little Corner with Molotov until 11:05 p.m.⁸⁹ No further sessions had been agreed to. Still, that circumstance had occurred twice before, and each time Molotov’s office had reinitiated contact. Sure enough, just after midnight, a courier arrived at the Finnish legation. But to the Finns’ dismay, the message, from Molotov, contained neither a new proposal nor an invitation, just casuistry about the concept of “territory.” Nonetheless, the Soviet side was maintaining communication. Later that morning (November 10), after a bit of sleep, the Finns sent their own letter. But they waited in vain on Saturday and Sunday (November 11–12) for another summons.

Privately, Mekhlis, head of the Red Army political department, told a gathering of the defense commission of the writers’ union, regarding Finland (November 10), that “our army is on the border, ready.” He added that “Germany was undertaking a useful thing, shattering the British empire. The latter’s destruction will lead to a general collapse of imperialism—this is clear.” Mekhlis, according to notes by the playwright Vishnevsky, stressed that the USSR’s main enemy was, “of course, England.”⁹⁰ Churchill continued to work to prevent a full-fledged Nazi-Soviet alliance. “I find your demands on Finland completely natural and normal,” he told Maisky over lunch (November 13), while reaffirming his view that it would be better for the Soviet Union, rather than Nazi Germany, to dominate the Baltic Sea. “I would like to hope, however, that the USSR will not resort to force to resolve its dispute with Finland. If the USSR did so, then—you yourself understand—it would make a most painful impression here in England and for a long period of time would render the improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations impossible.”⁹¹

Also on November 13, the Finnish delegation was called home from Moscow.⁹² No ranking member of the Soviet foreign affairs commissariat saw them off.⁹³ Pravda (November 13) sent them off with accusations that the Helsinki government was allowing Finland to be turned into “an armed camp” targeting the USSR.