Stalin полностью

Stalin also stated that night, in the presence of others, that “Voroshilov is a good fellow, but he is no military man.” The despot acknowledged that Finland had prepared for a major war, but in a way that went beyond its own military capabilities: “hangars for thousands of aircraft—whereas Finland had [only] several hundred of them.” He blustered that, as the Red Army now advanced, “there should be nothing left but the bare bones of a state” in Finland, adding, “We have no desire for Finland’s territory. But Finland should be a state that is friendly to the Soviet Union.” Then he proposed a toast: “To the fighters of the Red Army, which was untrained, badly clothed, and badly shod, which we are now providing with clothing and boots, which is fighting for its somewhat tarnished honor, fighting for its glory!”

Grigory Kulik arrived at the celebration bearing bad news from the front. Born into a peasant family near Poltava, Kulik had been a staff artillery officer in the tsarist army and became acquainted with Stalin during the civil war; by 1937, the despot had named the notorious bully and blockhead as head of the Red Army’s main artillery directorate. “You’re lapsing into panic,” Stalin now admonished him. “I shall send you [Georgy] Chelpanov’s book on the foundation of psychology.” Stalin noted that when the pagan Greek priests “would get disturbing reports, they would adjourn to their bathhouses, take baths, wash themselves clean, and only afterward would they assess events and make decisions.”¹⁹⁹

After the Lenin commemoration, between January 23 and February 3, Stalin received people in the Little Corner just once, in the wee small hours of January 29, and only briefly: Molotov (65 minutes), Mikoyan (30 minutes), Kulik (25 minutes), and Shaposhnikov (48 minutes).²⁰⁰ Later that day, Molotov telegrammed Kollontai in Stockholm, instructing her, to her astonishment, to inform the Swedish government that Soviet peace negotiations with the Finnish government in Helsinki would be possible.²⁰¹ Stalin could not have had any intention of conducting actual negotiations, given that planning was well under way for an immense Soviet offensive. Rather, the despot likely wanted to break any momentum, such as it was, in possible Western military assistance to the Finns. In February 1940, Stalin ordered Beria to recall Gorsky and shut down the entire Soviet intelligence station in London, for having served as a conduit of “disinformation.”²⁰²

MASSACRES

On February 10, 1940, in response to an article in Pravda summarizing a journal story about his heroic prerevolutionary underground exploits in Baku, Stalin lashed out at inaccuracies (pointing out he had never edited the oil workers’ newspaper) and the portrayal of Voroshilov (“Comrade Voroshilov was in Baku for only a few months, and then left Baku without leaving visible traces behind”). In the letter, which he marked “not for publication,” Stalin also cast doubt on the reminiscences used in the article, indicating that the memoirs had likely been “dictated” by journalists.²⁰³

Around this time, death sentences based upon fabricated evidence were implemented for cultural figures, as well as former NKVD first deputy Mikhail Frinovsky, former deputy foreign intelligence chief Spigelglas, former intelligence chief and Comintern operative Trilisser, Yefim Yevdokimov, and Redens, Stalin’s ethnic Polish brother-in-law (part of a “Polish diversionary-espionage group”). Frinovsky’s wife was executed the day before him; their son, a high school student, was executed not long thereafter. Under interrogation-torture, Redens had admitted his complicity in the annihilation of innocent people while working atop the NKVD in Ukraine, Moscow, and Kazakhstan. His wife Anna—Nadya’s sister—and their two boys were not touched, and the family continued to live in the elite House on the Embankment and were allowed to visit Svetlana at Zubalovo (but not the Kremlin).²⁰⁴