Soviet liquidation of the Polish officers in captivity took place around the same time as a similar Nazi action across the border under Hans Frank, who, explaining his operation, stated, “I admit, utterly openly, that this will cause the deaths of thousands of Poles, above all from the leading stratum of the Polish intelligentsia.”221 Soviet preparations for the executions might have commenced as early as January 1940. Through agents in Britain, the Soviets likely picked up on recent French whisperings to employ exiled Polish forces (“volunteers”) to attack Soviet positions in northern Finland, around Petsamo, a scenario that eventually could have had Polish army officers inside the USSR playing the role that the Czechoslovak Legion had played in 1918—namely, sparking a civil war.222 But whatever the anxieties, the massacres ultimately flowed from a bottomless well of Soviet-Polish enmity.223 Families of the executed, who were deported to Kazakhstan, were told nothing; all too many would not survive their own ordeals. A handful of top Polish officers, such as General Władysław Anders, were kept alive, perhaps for future use; some others survived by offering their services to the NKVD. The Katyn Forest slaughter would prove to be not just another epochal Soviet state crime, but a strategic blunder.
All of this occurred in strictest secrecy. For the Soviet people, fairy tales persisted.
REVELATION
On March 12, the Finnish government, reeling from Timoshenko’s furious Wall of Fire that had reduced Viipuri, now renamed Vyborg, to a bombed-out hulk and opened the road to Helsinki, capitulated. The NKVD reported that Finland appeared to be on the verge of total military collapse. Stalin refrained from trying to overrun the country entirely (which had not been his intention in the first place). He did not deign to participate in the numerous sessions required to hammer out the details of Helsinki’s acceptance of defeat. Molotov, reversing the original offer to cede a large part of Soviet Karelia, now claimed a chunk of Finnish Karelia, plus the Karelian Isthmus right through to Vyborg—well beyond prewar proposals. This was more territory than the Finns had lost in the fighting. When they objected, Molotov snapped, “Any other great power in our position would demand war reparations or all of Finland.” When the Finns pointed out that in 1721, Peter the Great had paid compensation for the expansion of Russia’s Baltic frontier, Molotov barked, “Write a letter to Peter the Great—if he orders it, we will pay compensation.”227
The consequences of Finland’s civilian leaders’ prewar refusal to cut a deal struck the country like a punch in the face.228 “The terms of the peace are onerous for us,” stated Tanner, a participant in the failed negotiations, “but the government is happy that the agreement does not limit Finland’s sovereignty and independence, and that the program of Kuusinen’s government has been abandoned.”229 Flags in Helsinki flew at half-mast, newspapers appeared with black borders, and the radio played funeral dirges.