421. Shirinia, Komintern v 1933 godu, 141–2 (citing RGASPI, f. 495, op. 25, d. 237, l. 69, 79–80; d. 233, l. 69–80). German Communist party turnover was high: Up to three-quarters of the members were unemployed and therefore unconnected to factories. Bahne, “Die Kommunistitche Partei Deutschlands,” 662; Grebing, Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 310.
422. Firsov, “Stalin i Komintern,” 10; Shirinia, Komintern v 1933 godu, 169–77 (citing RGASPI, f. 495, op. 18, d. 963, l. 134–5, 182). By late 1933, the number of legal Communist parties would dwindle to sixteen, from a peak of seventy-two; another seven were semilegal.
423. Robert Tucker held Stalin “chiefly responsible” for the failure of the German Communists and Social Democrats to work together in a united front of the left against Hitler, but did not explain how the two leftist parties would have reconciled in Stalin’s absence. Winkler argued that “the gulf between the two workers’ parties became so deep . . . that a common unified front was no longer imaginable.” Tucker, Stalin in Power, 225–32; Winkler, Der Weg, 864.
424. Ivnitskii, “Golod 1932–1933 gg.: kto vinovat?,” 36. Davies and Wheatcroft estimate perhaps as many as 70 million lived in regions affected by famine, even excluding the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 411.
425. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 47.
426. Ivnitskii, “Golod 1932–1933 godov: kto vinovat?,” 61 (citing the politburo archive without details). Peasants from “surplus” population regions were being forcibly resettled to ghost villages of the North Caucasus and elsewhere as well. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 428 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 929, l. 133, op. 162 d. 15, l. 100–1; GARF, f. 5446, op. 1, d. 470, l. 179–80). On March 17, 1933, the regime sought to restrict seasonal labor migration, requiring collective farm permission for exit and threatening food denial to “flitters who leave before the sowing and return for the harvest.” Pravda, March 20, 1933.
427. Antipova et al., Golod v SSSR, 254–65 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 11, d. 960, l. 1–12).
428. Maksudov, “Geografiia goloda 1933 goda”; Maksudov, “Ukraine’s Demographic Losses,” 27–43.
429. On March 15, Kosior sent a long report to Stalin from Ukraine begging for more tractors and food aid of not less than 36,000 tons. Antipova et al., Golod v SSSR, 304–17 (APRF, f. 3, op. 61, d. 794, l. 73–86). Ryskulov noted, correctly, that “the situation that has taken shape right now in Kazakhstan . . . cannot be found in any other territory or republic.” He even wrote that because of the previous local party leadership group, “it was forbidden officially to say (even in Alma-Ata, where Kazakh corpses were collected from the streets), that there was famine and deaths therefrom. More than that, local functionaries were not bold enough to admit that livestock had declined.” Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 204–25 (GARF, f. R-5446, op. 27, d. 23, l. 245–53); Ryskulov, Sobranie sochinenii, III: 320–48 (APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 6403, l. 138–46). See also Aldazhumanov et al., Nasil’stvennaia kollektivizatsiia, 220–3 (APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 5287, l. 33–8); Ăbdīraĭymūly et al., Golod v kazakhskoi stepi, 166–7 (APRK, f. 141, op. 1, d. 6403, l. 37), 196–200; Werth, “La famine au Kazakhstan”; and Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, III: 687–91 (RGASPI, f. 112, op. 47, d. 7, l. 26, 269–83: Dec. 23, 1933).
430. Stragglers were congregating near factories, according to Molchanov, and knocking on the doors of workers begging (“‘Help me, I was fired without cause.’ ‘Help me, I am a starving unemployed’”). Antipova et al., Golod v SSSR, 298–303 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 11, d. 56, l. 11–6). Khatayevich, in Dnepropetrovsk, reported (March 15, 1933) that “in reality there are no bazaars,” meaning no way to supplement rations. Golod 1932–33 rokiv na Ukraini, 465–7.
