383. “Information has reached the Central Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars about a mass exodus of peasants from the Kuban and Ukraine ‘for grain’ into the Central Black-Earth province, Volga, Moscow province, the Western province, Belorussia,” the decree stated. “The Central Committee and Council of People’s Commissars do not doubt that this peasant exodus, just as in the previous year from Ukraine, is organized by the enemies of Soviet power, the SRs and agents of Poland, with the aim of agitating ‘through the peasants’ in the northern regions of the USSR against collective farms and generally against Soviet power.” The decree was composed in Stalin’s hand; Molotov’s signature on the original was absent. Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, III: 634–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 45, l. 109–109ob.), 635–6 (f. 17, op. 42, d. 80, l. 9–11), 636–8 (d. 72, l. 109–11), 638 (l. 113); Oskolkov, Golod 1932/1933, 19 (citing PARO, f. 79, d. 74, l. 40). Yevdokimov, in his report on implementation, tied peasant flight to rebellion, and noted how the heavy secret police pressure was curbing the exodus. Stalin underlined these passages. By contrast, Balytsky, who gave exact numbers (31,963 people), observed that “in the majority of cases exodus is motivated by a search for earnings,” that “only part of those leaving villages are bringing their families,” and that “the exodus of collective farmers is of significantly less scope than that of individual farmers.” Stalin did not underline any of these revealing passages. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 392–4 (APRF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 189, l. 3–10). On Feb. 16, 1933, a politburo decree ordered the OGPU to apply the Jan. 22 interdiction decree to the Lower Volga. Ivnitskii, Golod 1932–1933 godov, 269–70 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 45, l. 109).
384. The regime proved better able to block emigration to Poland and Romania than into China, Iran, and Afghanistan. Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 237, 246–47. On March 1, the politburo granted extrajudicial troikas in Belorussia powers of execution in “cases of counterrevolutionary organizations and groupings consisting of kulaks and White Guard elements.” Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 63 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 1–2).
385. On Feb. 17, Yagoda reported the interdiction of 150,391 people across eight republics or regions, of whom 114,579 had been returned. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChk, 397–8 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 914, l. 1; op. 162, d. 14, l. 48, 51), 398–9 (APRF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 189, l. 26–7), 399–406 (d. 196, l. 127–38), 406–7 (d. 189, l. 36–6).
386. Pravda, Jan. 24, 1933.
387. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 245; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 232.
388. In July 1932, the Nazi party had received 13.7 million votes, 37 percent, and won 230 seats, vs. 133 seats for the Social Democrats. (The July 1932 turnout was Weimar’s largest, 84.1 percent.) In Nov. 1932, the Nazis dropped to 196 seats.
389. Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, II: 18–9. Nazi party membership, 25,000 in 1925 and around 2 million in 1933 when Hitler was made chancellor, would grow to 4.4 million by 1936, when membership requirements would be tightened. Over time, the Nazi party would become more proletarian; the Soviet party, less so. At the same time, Nazism enjoyed far stronger appeal in rural locales than the Soviet Community party did.
390. Jones, “Establishment of the Third Reich”; Jones, “Hindenburg and the Conservative Dilemma.” See also Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 83–4.
391. Winkler, Weimar, 509. “I solemnly prophesy to you that this damnable man will plunge our Reich into the abyss and bring inconceivable misery down upon our nation,” General Ludendorff wrote to Hindenburg. “Coming generations will curse you on your grave because of this action.” Fest, Hitler, 411. Ludendorff had collaborated with Hitler in the lunatic Beer Hall putsch of 1923.
392. Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power. The cabinet led by Hitler lacked a majority in the Reichstag, a fact von Papen concealed from Hindenburg. This was the third “presidential” cabinet in a row. See also Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, 443–80; and Kershaw, Hitler: 1889–1936, 374–5, 413–25.
393. Beckles, “Hitler, the Clown.”
394. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, II/iii: 120–1 (Jan. 31, 1933).
395. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 69; DBFP, 2nd series, IV: 402; Francois-Poncet, Souvenirs, 70.
396. Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis.
