224. Seishirō Itagaki, who as Kwantung Army intelligence chief had helped stage the Mukden incident to seize Manchuria and was promoted to Kwantung vice chief of staff, “urged Japanese predominance in Inner Mongolia, to deny the USSR a platform (like it enjoyed in Xinjiang) and to serve as a springboard for conquest of Outer Mongolia, which would allow takeover of the Soviet Far East almost without fighting.” Haslam, Threat from the East, 48–9 (citing Hoover Institution Archives, International Military Tribunal, the Far East Documents, 7830–33: prosecution document no. 1466, exhibit no. 761–A). Stalin decided to support Sheng, and NKVD operatives brought the leader of the anti-Sheng Muslim rebellion, General Ma Zhingying, to the Soviet Union, both to deflate the rebellion and for insurance. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 216–8; Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 594–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 90, l. 119, Oct. 1, 1935). On further developments, see Milward, Eurasian Crossroads, 200ff; and Ledovskii, SSSR i Stalin v sud’ba Kitaia, 190–1.
225. Baabar, Twentieth-Century Mongolia, 338–9. The Soviet Union continued to fudge the recognition question, so as not to anger Chiang Kai-shek’s government (which claimed “Outer” Mongolia as part of China), but Japan quietly hinted at recognizing Mongolia’s independence. In late Nov. 1935, the Mongols, following Soviet orders, had broken off a months-long Mongolia-Manchukuo conference to regulate their disputed border, citing Manchukuo’s demands for diplomatic recognition. DVP SSSR, XVIII: 649–50n172; Pravda, Nov. 21, 1935.
226. Chang and Halliday, Mao,139.
227. Haslam, Threat from the East, 61–5; DVP SSSR, XVIII: 587–8 (Dec. 9, 1935), 601–3 (Dec. 28). In Jan. 1936, the Soviet Union and Xinjiang signed an agreement on military and economic aid that excluded access to “third powers.” Hasiotis, Soviet Political, Economic, and Military Involvement, 100.
228. Haslam, Threat from the East, 50 (citing FRUS, 489–90: Henderson in Moscow to Hull in Washington, Dec. 14, 1935). The follow-up border incident took place on Dec. 19.
229. The Soviet foreign trade commissariat had sent Choibalsan 20 Gorky Factory (GAZ) automobiles, which the Moscow loyalist awarded as patronage to other Mongol ministers. Genden had felt constrained to send a lengthy report to Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov on implementation of Stalin’s recommendations, but also noted that 96.4 percent of Mongolia’s 731,686 people were illiterate, and expressed concern about Japanese war provocations. RGANI, f. 89, op. 63, d. 16, l. 1–33 (Oct. 14, 1935).
230. Baabar, Twentieth-Century Mongolia, 344–6.
231. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh, 185–6 (Svanidze diary: Dec. 26, 1935), 189. Kun, Stalin, 227. The polar explorer Belyakov witnessed an evening of dancing at Stalin’s Black Sea dacha: “He played many records, mostly Georgian folk songs. He explained to us that Georgians sing on their way to the market.” RGASPI, f. 558, op. 4, d. 668.
232. As of July 1935, the party had 1.66 million full members and 681,245 candidates. By the time the exchange process was all done, about a quarter million party cards would be confiscated. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 561, l. 127–64; Khlevniuk, 1937–i, 56–7. Yezhov’s report was published: Pravda, Dec. 26, 1935; Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, 1936, no. 2: 9–23. According to the NKVD date, as of Oct. 20, 1935, 255 “spies” had been expelled from the party, but the NKVD of Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East—the front line with Japan—together had found only one spy in the party ranks. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 822–3n169 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 2, d. 3, l. 131–4), 724–31 (op. 3, d. 62, l. 129–44).
233. Beria followed him to the dais, boasted that the South Caucasus NKVD had arrested 1,020 enemies through this month, and congratulated himself. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 561, l. 143, 146, 162.
234. Damage of machinery while operating it as well as the production or supply of poor quality goods became crimes of sabotage too. Andreyev gave the main report, for which he had been copiously supplied with NKVD materials on “sabotage” of the Stakhanovite movement. Other speakers cited cases of anti-Stakhanovite “sabotage” in their regions. Davies et al., Years of Progress, 171–2 (citing RGASPI, f. 73, op. 1, d. 141, l. 205; f. 17, op. 2, d. 561, l. 32: Ryndin); Pravda, December 29, 1935.
