314. The perceptive American John Scott cited four factors to explain the terror, two of which involved the presence of many “former” people, which he called “potentially good material for clever foreign agents to work with,” as well as the circumstance that Japan, Italy, and Germany “sent fifth-columnists of all kinds into Russia, as they did into every country” (italics added). The other two factors Scott cited were the long history of a secret police in Russia and Bolshevik intolerance toward opposition. Scott, Behind the Urals, 188–9. See also Davies, Mission to Moscow. See also the fellow traveler Strong, Stalin Era, 68; and Deutscher, Stalin, 376–7.
315. Stepanov, Rasstrel po limitu, 13–4. Sholokhov mentioned a fifth column in a letter to Stalin (Feb. 1938). Getty and Naumov, Road to Terror, 309; Murin, “‘Prosti menia, Koba . . .’: neizvestnoe pis’mo N. Bukharina,” 23 (APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 427, l. 13–8); “‘Vokrug menia vse eshche pletut chernuiu Pautinu . . . ,’” 18 (f. 45, op. 1, d. 827, l. 41–61, Feb. 16, 1938).
316. The influential Khlevniuk has asserted that, based upon the intelligence he was being fed, Stalin became convinced the Republican side in Spain was being defeated because of traitors in its midst and that he feared the same could happen in the Soviet Union, goading him to undertake the domestic terror. Kuromiya, another top scholar, sought to refine the point, arguing that Stalin feared not latent internal opposition per se but internal opposition transformed by a war launched from without. Khlevniuk, “Objectives of the Great Terror,” 158–76; Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 173 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 223, l. 90, 141–2, 146); Kuromiya, “Accounting for the Great Terror.”
317. Border guards were gathering the harvest. Solov’ev and Chugnuov, Pogranichnye voiska SSSR, 9–10.
318. Voennye arkhivy Rossii, 104; Lebedev, “M. N. Tukhachevskii i ‘voenno-fashistskii zagovor,’” 247–8.
319. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 296 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1049, l. 260–1, 265, July 14, 1937), 297; Suvenirov, “Klim, Koba skazal,” 57–8.
320. During the nine days after the in-camera trial, nearly 1,000 more Soviet commanders and military intelligence operatives were arrested, a number now continuously rising. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 190–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 4, d. 30, l. 250–1; APRF, f. 3, op. 46, d. 807, l. 62); “Delo o tak nazyvaemoi ‘antisovetskoi trotskistskoi organizatsii’ v Krasnoi Armii,” 57; Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 160–1.
321. Rybalkin, Operatisia “X,” 64 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 852, l. 115); Wheatley, Hitler and Spain, 102–3; Proctor, Hitler’s Luftwaffe. It has been estimated that barring its losses in Spain, Italy could have gone to war in June 1940 with 50 full strength divisions, instead of the 19 full and 34 partial strength it mounted. Sullivan, “Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement,” 703, 718.
322. Some 100 Soviet military advisers served in Spain in 1936, 50 in 1937, 250 in 1938, and 95 in 1939, for a total of 495. Rybalkin, Operatsiia “X,” 57 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 870, l. 344; f. 35082, op. 1, d. 15, l. 47–9); Tolmachaev, “Sovetskii Soiuz i Ispaniia,” 150 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1143, l. 127). See also Kowalsky, Stalin, paragraph 768 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 912, l. 158; d. 961, l. 170–1).
323. Kowalsky, Stalin, paragraph 577. See also Krivitsky, In Stalin’s Secret Service, 95.
324. Mallett, Mussolini, 92.
325. Leitz, Economic Relations. Spain enabled Göring to increase his role in German economic planning at home. Franco was uneasy but had to accept Germany’s economic aggrandizement inside Spain. Germany was able to obtain militarily significant raw materials—pyrites, copper, mercury, zinc (some 80 percent of Spanish exports of key materials were going to Germany by 1939), while Spain went into debt to Berlin. Wheatley, Hitler and Spain, 85.
