Stalin полностью

198. APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 177, l. 116–36.

199. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 124–5, 144–5. In a lecture on June 26, 1940, at the Frunze Military Academy concerning the lessons of the Finnish war, Meretskov would claim that the Finns had built 150 airfields to receive foreign aircraft. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 31n55 (citing RGVA, f. 34980, op. 14, d. 6, l. 1).

200. Na prieme, 290.

201. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 481 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 12, l. 59). See also Tanner, Winter War, 125–63.

202. West and Tsarev, Crown Jewels, 144 (citing an inaccessible secret History of the London Rezidentura, in Russian, file no. 89113, I: 434).

203. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1509, l. 82–4. Stalin was responding to E. Gorodetsky’s article in Pravda (Feb. 4, 1940), which was a summary of M. Moskalev’s article in Istorik-Marksist (Jan. 1940). Later, on April 27, 1940, when Yaroslavsky sought to rebut Stalin by citing many sources, Stalin again exploded (“sycophancy is incompatible with scientific history”). RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 842, l. 35–44.

204. Zhukovskii, Lubianskaia imperiia NKVD, 214–5.

205. http://alya-aleksej.narod.ru/index/0-181; Voronov, “Palach v kozhanom fartuke”; Nikita Petrov, “Chelovek v kozhanom fartuke lichno rasstrelial bolee desiati tysiach chelovek” http://discussiya.com/2010/08/26/blokhin-executioner. Stalin signed the list, containing 457 names, including Yezhov’s, on Jan. 17, 1940: APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 177, l. 116–36. Another principal executioner was the Latvian Pēteris Mago, Russified as Pyotr Maggo (1879–1941), who would soon die of cirrhosis of the liver.

206. Ushakov and Stukalov, Front voennykh prokurorov, 75 (USSR deputy military procurator Nikolai Afanasev, who was present). Among the many rumors that would circulate inside the NKVD about Yezhov’s execution, one had Beria ordering that Yezhov undress and be beaten before being shot, just as Yezhov had done to humiliate his predecessor Yagoda. Kamov, “Smert’ Nikolai Ezhova.”

207. “Poslednee slovo Nikolai Ezhova,” Moskovskie novosti, Jan. 30–Feb. 6, 1994; Petrov and Jansen, Stalinskii pitomets, 536 (citing TsA FSB, sledstvennoe delo No. N-15302, t. 1, l. 184–6); Getty and Naumov, Road to Terror, 560–2.

208. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 212.

209. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 153; Solovev, My Nine Lives, 119; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 13; Baryshnikov et al., Istoriia ordena Lenina, 137.

210. Valedinskii, “Vospominaniia,” 124. Vyborg fell roughly three weeks later. On Stalin’s illness and treatment in mid-February 1940, see also Chigirin, Stalin, 115–20 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1482, l. 101–5ob.).

211. In Nov. 1939, thanks to Gerhard Kegel, the Soviet agent, the NKVD managed to photograph a long document on the German negotiating strategy in the talks, including the maximum prices the Germans would pay for various Soviet goods. “The negotiations were difficult and lengthy,” the German trade negotiator Karl Schnurre wrote in an internal memorandum, adding that, because “the Soviet Union does not import any consumer goods whatsoever, their wishes concerned exclusively manufactured goods and war materiel. Thus, in numerous cases, Soviet bottlenecks coincide with German bottlenecks, such as machine tools for the manufacture of artillery ammunition.” On top of that, “psychologically the ever-present distrust of the Russians was of importance as well as the fear of any responsibility. And people’s commissar Mikoyan had to refer numerous questions to Stalin personally, since his authority was not sufficient.” DGFP, series D, VIII: 752–9 (economic agreement), 814–7 (Schnurre memorandum); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 131–4; Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 97–106; Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 439.

212. Pravda did not crow in its announcement. Pravda, Feb. 18, 1940. See also Werth, Russia at War, 62–71.

213. After his Dec. 1939 offensive quickly petered out, Chiang, in Feb. 1940, had convened a military conference in Liuzhou (Guangxi). He attributed Japan’s strength to its surprise attacks (on poorly defended places), stout defense of occupied positions, and disguise of movements. He saw its weakness in a failure to deploy sufficient forces, sustain its operations for sufficient time, and prepare sufficient reserves. Ryōichi, “Japanese Eleventh Army,” 227–8, citing Dai Tōa Sensō (Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan, 1977), in the series Shō Kaiseki Hiroku, XIII: 47–8.

214. Taylor, Generalissimo, 171 (citing Chiang Diaries, Hoover Institution archives, box 40, folder 15: Dec. 30, 1939).