227. Upton, Finland, 140 (citing J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 187, 191); Tanner, Winter War, 235. For brief excerpts of the Finnish record of the March 12 discussions, in Russian translation, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 497–503.
228. For a Finnish police summary (March 15, 1940) of the domestic shock from the peace terms, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 519–22.
229. Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 190.
230. Vakar, “Milukov v izgnan’e’,” 377.
231. “The USSR, to be sure, received strategic gains in the northwest, but at what price?” Trotsky wrote in March 1940. “The prestige of the Red Army is undermined. The trust of the toiling masses and exploited peoples of the whole world has been lost. As a result the international position of the USSR has not been strengthened but weakened.” He added that Stalin “personally has emerged from this operation completely smashed.” Trotskii, “Stalin posle finliandskogo opyta [March 13, 1940],” in Portrety revoliutsionerov, 162–66 (at 166). Trotsky later clarified that “it does not follow from this that the USSR must be surrendered to the imperialists but only that the USSR must be torn out of the hands of the bureaucracy.” Trotsky, “Balance Sheet of the Finnish Events.” See also Trotsky, “A Petty-Bourgeois Opposition in the Socialist Workers Party” (Dec. 15, 1939), published posthumously in In Defense of Marxism, 44–62 (at 56–9).
232. This concession appears to have been connected to Finland’s efforts to sign a defensive alliance with Sweden and Norway, which Molotov warned Helsinki would be considered a violation of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty. Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 196; van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 190.
233. Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 263–75.
234. Waltz, Theory of International Relations, 194–5; Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas.”
235. Solodovnikov,”My byli molodye togda,” 210.
236. Timoshenko told the Finnish military attaché in Moscow, “the Russians have learnt much in this hard war in which the Finns fought with heroism.” Mannerheim, Memoirs, 371. Altogether, from Sept. 1939 through March 12, 1940, Red Army call-ups had amounted to 3.16 million. About half were demobilized, leaving an army of 1.547 million. Mikhail Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 360 (citing RGVA, f. 40443, op. 3, d. 297, l. 128).
237. Krivosheev, Grif sekretnosti sniat’, 93–126 (esp. 125); RGVA, f. 34980, op. 15, d. 200, 203, 204, 206, 208, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219; f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1301, l. 165–8; Rossiiskaia Federatsiiia, Kniga pamiati; Manninen, “Moshchnoe Sovetskoe nastuplenie,” I: 324–35; “O nakoplenii nachal’stvuiushchego sostava Raboche-Krest’ianskoi Krasnoi Armii,” 181; Balashov, Prinimai nas, 182, 186. Neither Hanko nor the islands would prove to be any protection for Leningrad, since the future Nazi onslaught against the city would not come from the Baltic Sea/Gulf of Finland but from overland.
238. Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, 130. In early spring 1940, right after the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, the Soviet ambassador to Paris, Surits, would be declared persona non grata after sending a telegram to Moscow, intercepted by the French, in which he referred to the French and British as warmongers. It was payback.
239. The German ambassador to Finland (Wipert von Blücher) sent a report to Berlin in Jan. noting that “the Red Army has such shortcomings that it cannot even dispose of a small country and the Comintern does not even gain ground in a population that is more than forty percent socialist.” Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 411; Semiryaga, Winter War, 63–4 (no citation). German circles were said by a Swedish Soviet agent to be stunned by the dismal Soviet effort, and wondered about the necessity of abiding by the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 220–1, 224–8.
240. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI: 981–2 (Dec. 31, 1939).
241. Förster and Mawdsley, “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective,” 68. See also Förster, “German Military’s Image of Russia,” 123–4.
242. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, xii-xiii, 103–27, 189–193.
243. Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War.”
