19. That day Cripps had visited Maisky on his own initiative, and sought to ensure cooperation following the German invasion that Cripps knew was coming. Maisky’s detailed summary of the conversation was received in Moscow on June 22 at 11:00 a.m. “Iz neopublikovannykh dokumentov (Beseda I. Maiskogos) S. Krippsom 21 iiunia 1941g.), 39. See also Vishlev, Nakanune, 51. Gorodetsky (personal communication) notes that Maisky had decided to spend the weekend at the country house of his old friend, Negrín, the last Spanish Republican prime minister, and that the envoy would be genuinely surprised when he heard the news of war. Beyond his fear of crossing Stalin, he could not get out of his head that all the warnings might just be a self-serving British provocation. Supposedly, Major General Susloparov (“Maro”), the military attaché and intelligence chief in Vichy, sent a message on June 21 that the invasion would begin the next morning, and Stalin wrote on it: “This information is an English provocation. Clarify who is the author of this provocation and punish him.” This document has not been published. Ivashutin, “Dokladyvala tochno,” 57; Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 2, 1991 (Ivashutin interview). Susloparov had told his French interlocutors (June 18) that Germany would not attack the USSR, that the rumors, being spread out of Germany (not Britain, as he formerly believed), formed part of the “pressure which the German government is expected to exert on Moscow to increase considerably the delivery of grain, oil products, and other raw materials, indispensable for continuing the war.” Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 307–8 (citing Quai d’Orsay Archives, 835/Z312/2: 261–4). See also Trepper, Great Game, 127.
20. Later, Dekanozov would be accused of having edited reports to Moscow to downplay the attack warnings, at least through late May, but in June he began to try to reduce Soviet personnel (arrivals kept coming, however, including children and pregnant wives). On June 15, he summoned the courage to telegram Molotov: “The news is that now people do not speak about the concentration as Germany demonstration to compel concessions from the USSR. Now they affirm that this is for genuine preparation for war against the Soviet Union.” Berezhkov, History in the Making, 72; “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, 76–7. Lehmann (“Breitenbach”), in Gestapo counterintelligence, a Soviet source since 1929, evidently told his handler (now the young, inexperienced Boris Zhuravlyov) at a meeting in the outskirts of Berlin on the evening of June 19 that his Gestapo unit had received an order that Germany would invade the USSR on June 22 at 3:00 a.m. But no such communication has been published. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 348; Kolpakidi and Prokhorov, Vneshniaia razvedka Rossii, 454; Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka, 263–4. Beria supposedly erupted at Dekanozov (his former minion who now reported to Molotov and who sent the Lehmann message), writing to Stalin: “I again insist on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, who keeps on bombarding me with deza about a supposed Hitler attack on the USSR. . . . He reported that the attack commences tomorrow.” But this document has not been published. Ivashutin, “Dokladyvala tochno,” 57; Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 2, 1991: 5 (Ivashutin interview); Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 283–4; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 46. See also Krasnaia zvezda, June 16 and 21, 2001; and Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 2001, no. 22: 7.
21. Mikoian, Tak bylo, 377.
22. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 694 (TsAMO f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 463); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 398–9 (TsAMO, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 463); Fesiun, Delo Rikhard Zorge, 121.
23. On June 21, Berlings (“Peter”) reported to his German handlers that Filippov, the TASS journalist-intelligence operative, told him: “We are firmly convinced that Hitler has ventured a colossal bluff. We do not believe that the war could begin tomorrow . . . It is clear that the Germans intend to exert pressure on us in the hope of attaining advantages, which Hitler needs for continuation of the war.” Vishlev, Nakanune, 61 (PA SS Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop. Vertarauliche Berichte über Russland [Peter], 2/3 [R 27113], Bl. 462604–62605), 164; Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 96.
