342. Primakov, Ocherki, IV: 17–25 (Fitin’s remembrances, evidently composed in 1970). Another version of Fitin’s recollections appeared in Pravda, May 8, 1989 (A. Baidakov, citing conversations with Fitin). This episode provoked the one systematization of NKGB intelligence: back at HQ, Fitin’s team would produce a “Calendar of Information Obtained through Corsican and Elder,” a chronological summary from the first report (Sept. 6, 1940) through the latest (June 16, 1941), running to eleven typed pages. “We were given all the material from every espionage station,” Rybkina recalled. “We got to work. Zhuravlyov and I did not leave the office. We looked at individual files, we looked at how much a source could be trusted, how their previously supplied information had been confirmed and so on. We did everything to make sure that the information was thoroughly tested and checked.” The Calendar conveyed that there would be a German invasion; only the details and timing were uncertain. Still, the compilers wondered whether Stalin’s skepticism could somehow be right, since he had not just their NKGB reports but also those of military intelligence, embassies, trade representatives, journalists, and who knew what else. Merkulov was in the Little Corner on the evening of June 20 for an hour, but, if the document was completed by then, he evidently shrank from presenting it to the despot. Nor did he sign it. Fitin was said to have returned it to Zhuravlyov with a notation: “You keep this. P[avel] F[itin]. June 22.” Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 286–96; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 400–7 (TsA FSB); Primakov, Ocherki, III: 431–2, 452, 493n33. Gorodetsky asserts (without citation) that the finalized document only got to Merkulov hours after the German attack, then made its way to the archives. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 297. In parallel to the Calendar [kalendar’] compiled by the NKGB, military intelligence put together a List [perechen’], which is undated. The list, which was not comprehensive, contained 56 reports of Germany’s war preparations, 54 of them received since Jan. 1941. Fully 20 came from one source—Kegel (“X”)—and 10 from another: Yeremin (“Yeshenko”). Thirty-seven offered a date for a German attack; some of the dates overlapped, but they varied and several were imprecise. Of the sixteen reports that indicated the principal thrust for a German attack, ten specified Ukraine. There is a high likelihood that the list was compiled after the invasion, in late June, perhaps in connection with Stalin’s summons of Golikov, Timoshenko, and Zhukov on June 28, 1941 or shortly thereafter. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 701–13; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 220–34 (citing TsAMO, op. 7272, d. 1, l. 87–98).
343. The report also said the Germans would target Svir-3 power station, which could be judged to have little military significance. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 161–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1914–6); “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 221; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 382–3 (APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 415, l. 50–2); Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 236–7 (TsA FSK), 237–8; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 487–8 (TsA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1914–6). Gorodetsky speculates that Stalin was rattled. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 296–7.
344. The Germans assumed that any British-Soviet negotiations would be leaked, and there were no such leaks (the British press was besotted with predictions of Hitler’s blackmail of the USSR). Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 76–7 (citing PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretär, Russland, Bd. 5 [R 29716], Bl. 087 [113491], 146 [113540]; Dienstelle Ribbentrop UdSSSR-RC 7/1 [R 27168], Bl. 26071).
345. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 480–1 (CAB 65/22, WM [41] 60 CA, June 16).
