But how? The German press (on Goebbels’s instruction) carried no mention of the sensational news of Stalin’s assumption of the premiership.216 Dekanozov, who had been unable to engage Hitler, was called back from Berlin to Moscow “for consultations.” During the May Day parade, Stalin had placed him front and center on the Lenin Mausoleum, a message to the Germans that Schulenburg picked up.217 But the despot had been waiting upon Schulenburg’s return from his meeting with Hitler, expecting him to bring proposals, and although the count had conspicuously arrived (April 30) on Ribbentrop’s personal plane, he did not even call on the Kremlin. In a May 2 coded telegram from Moscow, Schulenburg complained to the German foreign ministry that he could not fulfill his assignment to tamp down the rumors about a pending war between Germany and the Soviet Union. “Everyone coming to Moscow or traveling through Moscow not only is bringing these rumors, but can confirm them by citing facts.”218 More important was the information brought back from Moscow by acting military attaché Hans Krebs (substituting for Köstring, who had contracted severe pneumonia). Krebs, in Berlin on May 5, told chief of staff Halder that “Russia will do anything to avoid war and yield on every issue short of making territorial concessions.”219
That same day, however, an ostensible breakthrough occurred: Schulenburg hosted Dekanozov at his single-story villa on Clean Lane for breakfast. The deputy foreign affairs commissar was accompanied by Vladimir Pavlov, the interpreter (who was now director of the German desk at the foreign affairs commissariat); also present was the Russian-speaking Hilger. The count told his Soviet interlocutors that relations needed to be improved; too many rumors were circulating about war. He discussed the May 4 speech by Hitler, mentioning that the Führer had found the Soviet-Yugoslav Pact “strange,” and noted that Hitler had pointed out that Balkan developments had compelled him to “undertake some precautionary measures on the eastern border of Germany,” because his “life experience had taught him to be extremely cautious, and the events of the past few years had made him even more cautious.” Schulenburg returned several times to the need to quell the rumors of war, but he offered no ideas about how to stop them; Hilger interceded to suggest they meet again.220
On May 7, the Soviet military intelligence agent Gerhard Kegel (“X”), deputy head of the economics section at the German embassy in Moscow, met twice with his handler, Konstantin Leontyev (“Petrov”), reporting that Germany’s “high command has given the order to complete readiness of the war theater and concentrate all forces in the East by June 2, 1941.” In one of his more than 100 communications about German war preparations, “X” gave the number of German and allied troops as 2 million in East Prussia, 3 million in former Poland, and 2 million in Hungary and the Balkans—7 million total—and insisted that the decision for war had been taken, irreversibly.221
On May 9, “Elder” reported that “in the headquarters of German aviation, preparations for an operation against the USSR are being conducted at a reinforced pace. All data testify to the fact that an attack is set for the near future. In conversations among officers of the headquarters, May 20 is often mentioned as a date for the onset of war against the USSR. In these same circles they declare that initially Germany will present the USSR with an ultimatum for more expansive exports to Germany and abandonment of Communist propaganda.” To ensure fulfillment, he added, the Germans would station commissars at Ukrainian industrial and agricultural centers, and the German army would occupy some Ukrainian provinces. “The presentation of an ultimatum will be preceded by a ‘war of nerves’ aiming to demoralize the USSR.”222, 223
