Stalin offered another gesture toward Germany, formally breaking off diplomatic relations and ordering the embassies of the countries that had fallen under Nazi occupation—Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Norway, Yugoslavia—shuttered, and their envoys expelled. Dekanozov, meanwhile, reciprocated the breakfast at the Spiridonovka on May 9. Schulenburg urged the Soviets to take the initiative, advising Dekanozov to have Stalin send a personal letter to the Führer. Dekanozov suspected some sort of ploy, and badgered the count about whether Hitler had authorized such an exchange. Schulenburg, having placed himself, his family, and Hilger in danger with his unauthorized suggestion, backed off. Dekanozov brought the discussion back to a possible joint communiqué. Schulenburg said they needed to act with great alacrity and that if they forwarded a draft text for approval, Ribbentrop or Hitler might not be in Berlin, causing delays.224 The courtly, well-intentioned Prussian nobleman was trying to induce Stalin to launch a bold diplomatic initiative—precisely what Hitler most feared.
Also on May 9, the Council of People’s Commissars had its first meeting under the new configuration. “Stalin did not conceal his disapproval of Molotov,” according to the notetaker. “He very impatiently listened to Molotov’s rather prolix responses to critical remarks from members of the bureau. . . . It seemed as if Stalin was attacking Molotov as an adversary and that he was doing so from a position of strength. . . . Molotov’s breathing began to quicken, and at times he would let out a deep sigh. He fidgeted in his chair and murmured something to himself. By the end he could take it no longer. ‘Easier said than done,’ Molotov stated, sharply but quietly. Stalin heard him. ‘It has long been known who fears criticism,’ Stalin answered menacingly. Molotov winced but kept quiet. The others silently buried their noses in their papers. . . . At this meeting I once again saw the majesty and strength of Stalin,” the notetaker wrote. “Stalin’s companions feared him like the devil. They would agree with him on practically anything.”225
SENSATIONAL MISSION
In May 1941, Germans were hearing rumors that Stalin and Molotov had murdered each other.226 On May 10, “Alta” relayed to Moscow that the German war ministry had instructed all military attachés abroad to repudiate the rumors of imminent war with the USSR and to explain the troop concentrations in the east by a desire “to be ready to counter actions from the Russian side and exert pressure on Russia.”227 Here, finally, was an insight into the disinformation campaign.228
On May 12, a third breakfast took place, again at Schulenburg’s residence. Dekanozov immediately told him that Stalin was ready to exchange letters with Hitler and sign a joint German-Soviet communiqué. Schulenburg had tried to give himself some diplomatic cover for his initiative by telegramming Berlin with a suggestion that the German government offer congratulations to Stalin on his appointment to head the government, and a warning that the Soviet regime had likely prepared an evacuation capital farther east that would be difficult to seize (hints of Napoleon, who had captured Moscow yet still failed to win the war). But a reply from Weizsäcker, received just before Dekanozov’s arrival, indicated that Schulenburg’s proposal had not even been presented to Ribbentrop (“because this would not have been a rewarded matter”). A parallel letter from a contact in the Berlin foreign ministry warned Schulenburg that he was being closely watched. Dekanozov noted that Schulenburg was now “quite emotionless.” The count emphasized that he had acted “on his own initiative only and without authority” and implored them “several times not to reveal that he had made these proposals.”229
Schulenburg nonetheless again tried to impress upon the Soviets the gravity of the situation and the need for them to take proactive measures, urging, according to the Soviet notetaker, that “it would be good if Stalin himself on his own initiative and spontaneously were to approach Hitler with a letter.” Then, in a discussion of British bombing of Germany, he made a highly enigmatic observation: “In his opinion, the time is not far off when they (the two warring sides) must reach an agreement and then the calamity and destruction raining down on each of their cities will end.”
Stalin received Dekanozov in his office at night on both May 8 and 12, 1941, so he was apprised of the frustrating “talks.”230 Soon the despot came to see why. On May 13, although details were scarce, he learned of a sensation reported out of Berlin the previous night: Rudolf Hess, deputy to the Führer within the Nazi party, had flown to Britain.
