The volatile Zhukov had formed a tight duo with the ponderous Timoshenko, another veteran of the civil-war-era First Cavalry Army, in whom he could cautiously confide, provided they could get out of earshot of their bodyguards, drivers, cooks, and maids, who closely observed them, on Beria’s orders. “The idea to preempt the German attack,” Zhukov would tell an interviewer, “came to Timoshenko and me in connection with Stalin’s speech of May 5, 1941 . . . in which he spoke of the possibility of an offensive mode of action.”254 Zhukov would also recall that he and Timoshenko did not sign the preemptive strike plan above their printed names, preferring to report on it preliminarily to Stalin. At an hour-long meeting on May 19, as Zhukov reported, Stalin apparently knocked his pipe nervously on the felt-covered table. “When he heard about a preemptive strike against the German troops he just boiled over,” Zhukov wrote, adding that Stalin blurted out, “What, have you lost your mind? You want to provoke the Germans?”255 Molotov, who was present, would recall that Stalin likely feared that a Soviet attack would induce Britain and even the United States to join Germany in a war against the USSR; at a minimum, the despot anticipated that a Soviet attack on Germany would drive London to make peace with Berlin, particularly in light of the Hess mission, clearing the way for attack in the east.256
In the meeting, Stalin explained away his May 5 (pre-Hess) speech as an attempt “to encourage the people there, so that they would think about victory and not about the invincibility of the German army, which is what the world’s press is blaring on about,” Zhukov recalled. “So that’s how our idea about a preemptive strike was buried.”257 In fact, the plan did not specify a date for launching a war, and did not motivate an
To achieve anything like the attack posture in the preemptive plan, the Red Army would have needed many months of very intensive preparation from that point forward.261 In any case, Stalin did not approve the general mobilization or force concentrations necessary for preemption. There was no aerial reconnaissance of German positions to be struck.262 The despot held fast to the idea of forward defense and counterattack, but in his mind general mobilization made war unavoidable, foreclosing his diplomatic and stalling options. If Hitler was not so mad as to voluntarily open a two-front war—as Stalin said often—then the Führer would have to negotiate a separate peace with Britain to attack the USSR. That was why Stalin desperately wanted to know the details of Hess’s “peace proposals.” After all, the despot might be able to offer his own terms to Germany, and Hitler, being smart, would want to see what he could obtain from each side before making a choice. Even if the Nazis made the mistake of voluntarily opening a two-front war, Stalin assumed that any German attack would be preceded by demands for far-reaching concessions, negotiations that Stalin could drag out.
Strikingly, though, almost everything in the May 15 war plan except the preemptive strike was being implemented. Stalin had summoned Timoshenko and Zhukov to the Little Corner on May 10 and 12, and on May 13 the general staff had been able to order deployment to the western frontier of interior reserves—four armies (28 rifle divisions) from the Urals, Volga, North Caucasus, and Baikal military districts—by July 10, with more readied for future transfer.263 Stalin had also allowed Timoshenko and Zhukov to introduce “covering plans” in frontier military districts, which would enable hidden troop concentration.264 Stalin was enabling implementation of the approved 1940 war plan, the massive left hook below the Pripet Marshes, should the Wehrmacht attack. As a result, the Soviet Union was as vulnerable to a deep German penetration as it was incapable of launching a preemptive attack.
