On June 10, Germany’s high command issued a supersecret order confirming the invasion for June 22, at 3:30 a.m. It stipulated that “June 18 is the latest for a possible delay,” and that a signal would be issued on June 21 at 13:00 hours—either “Dortmund” (attack on) or “Alton” (attack delayed).313 On June 11, NKGB intelligence chief Fitin reported from a source in Helsinki to Merkulov that, at a meeting of the Finnish government two days earlier, Finnish president Risto Ryti had said that Germany was forcing him to order a partial mobilization, but that “the question of whether or not there will be a war between Germany and the USSR would be answered June 24. Maybe there will be no war, since Hitler and Ribbentrop are against a war with the USSR, but the German generals and general staff desire it.”314 On June 12, Tupikov (“Arnold”), in Berlin, based on information from Scheliha (“Aryan”), told Moscow military intelligence that the invasion would occur “June 15–20.”315
German mapping for the bombing campaign intensified. “Violations of Soviet borders by German planes are not accidental, as confirmed by the direction and depth of the flights above our territory,” Beria wrote to Stalin on June 12. “In a few instances they had penetrated 60 miles or more and in the direction of military installations and large troop concentrations.”316 In parallel, the Luftwaffe began moving its attack planes to frontier aerodromes in occupied Poland, a massive concentration of fighters that could not be missed—they were jammed into a very narrow space, right up against the Soviet frontier, which would make them highly vulnerable unless they were about to go into combat.317 That same day, Berlings (“Peter”) reported to the Ribbentrop bureau that Ivan Filippov—nominally the TASS correspondent in Berlin, and the go-between who had introduced Berlings to Amayak Kobulov—had been ordered “to clarify whether or not Germany is actively pursuing peace negotiations with England and whether or not to expect an attempt in the longer term to secure a compromise with the United States.” Filippov was also now directed to convey the impression that “we are convinced it is indeed possible to maintain our peace policy. There is still time.”318, 319
Stalin tried to seize the initiative, composing a TASS bulletin, read out over Moscow radio at 6:00 p.m. on June 13 and published in Soviet newspapers the next morning. The impetus appears to have been the intensified speculation of a German-Soviet war that accompanied Cripps’s recall to London. In issuing the bulletin, Stalin was effectively following the suggestion Schulenburg had made to Dekanozov that the Soviet leader write to Hitler, but the despot decided on the form of an open letter. “Germany is also, just as consistently as the USSR, observing the terms of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact,” it stated. “In view of this, according to Soviet circles, rumors of Germany’s intent to break the Pact and to attack the USSR are utterly groundless.” Stalin aimed not only to refute the rumors of war, again blaming them on British provocations to cause that very war, but also to elicit a German denial of any intentions to attack—or, failing that, a German presentation of its anticipated demands, which the rumors said the USSR had already received and rejected, bringing the countries to imminent military confrontation. “Germany,” the bulletin noted, “has not presented any demands to the USSR and did not propose any new, even closer agreement, in view of which negotiations on this subject cannot be taking place.”320
Nazi foreign ministry officials had already instructed the management of the Schloss Bellevue, where Molotov had stayed during his Berlin visit, to prepare for Soviet dignitaries in the near future, while the Anhalter Station had been closed to the public at the beginning of June so it could be outfitted with a large electric red star and Soviet banners. Staff were told not to mention anything, prompting gossip. Rumors absolutely engulfed Berlin that Stalin would arrive at any moment by armored train, or that he and Hitler would meet at the border, or that Hitler was secretly discussing the scope of Germany’s imminent demands. One German woman recorded in her diary that her milkman had assured her that hundreds of women were sewing Soviet flags.321 Some people assumed that the TASS announcement had been published with German agreement.322
The foreign affairs commissariat had handed the text to Schulenburg, who relayed it to Berlin.323 But the German press did not publish it. The press secretary of the German foreign ministry, on June 14, refused to comment on it, despite insistent questioning by foreign journalists.324
