Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 полностью

British officials, however, did not relinquish the idea of an ultimatum that would allow Hitler to win without fighting, though there was debate about whether Stalin would make the necessary concessions, whatever they might be.³³⁶ The British could afford to be wrong; Stalin could not. June 15, a date for the onset of war mentioned by Scheliha (“Aryan”) from Berlin, and Sorge (“Ramsay”) from Tokyo, among others, passed without hostilities. That day, Ribbentrop instructed his ambassadors in the capitals of Germany’s allies—Rome, Budapest, Tokyo—to inform the governments there that Germany intended “to introduce complete clarity in German-Russian relations at the latest at the beginning of July and in this regard to put forth certain demands.” The directive went straight to Stalin.³³⁷ Also that day, Sorge composed a message (transmitted two days later) that “a German courier told the military attaché that he is convinced that the war against the USSR is delayed, probably, until the end of June. The military attaché does not know whether there will be war or not.”³³⁸

From Berlin on June 16, Tupikov (“Arnold”), of military intelligence, transmitted the latest message from the Soviet Union’s best spy, “Aryan,” reporting that in Germany’s high command, people were now talking of “June 22–25.”^{339, 340} Also on June 16, the NKGB’s Amayak Kobulov (“Zakhar”), in Berlin, again reported that “Elder” had relayed that “all military measures by Germany in preparation for an invasion of the USSR have been utterly completed, and that the strike can be expected at any moment.” “Elder” did not mention an ultimatum (his report five days earlier had still suggested it as a possibility).

Details on the imminent attack specified that German planes would in the first instance bomb Moscow factories producing parts for airplanes—but these, as Stalin knew, were beyond the range of German aircraft. The report added that “in air ministry circles the TASS communiqué of June 6 [sic] was being treated very ironically. They stress that the declaration can have no significance whatsoever.” And it stated that “in the economics ministry they say that at a meeting of managers designated for ‘occupied territories of the USSR,’ [Alfred] Rosenberg also spoke, and declared that ‘the concept of the “Soviet Union” should be wiped from the geographical map.’” Fitin sent a summary to Merkulov. “Late on the night of June 16–17 the commissar called me at my office,” Fitin would recall, “and said that at 1:00 p.m. he and I had been summoned to see I. V. Stalin.”

In the Little Corner, Stalin did not invite them to sit. Fitin noticed a pile of intelligence reports on the felt table, with his latest on top. As he reported, the despot paced the office. Then, complaining intemperately of disinformation in the reports of imminence of war, Stalin ordered that they go back and recheck all the messages from “Corsican” and “Elder.”³⁴¹ “Despite our deep knowledge and firm intention to defend our point of view on the material received by the intelligence directorate, we were in an agitated state,” Fitin would later recall. “This was the Leader of the party and country with unimpeachable authority. And it could happen that something did not please Stalin or he saw an oversight on our part and any one of us could end up in a very unenviable situation.”³⁴² Stalin’s displeasure was indeed severe. “To Comrade Merkulov,” he wrote in bright green pencil across the commissar’s cover note accompanying Fitin’s report, “you can send your ‘source’ from German aviation HQ to his fucking mother. This is not a ‘source’ but a disinformationist.”³⁴³

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