7. Stalin’s radicalism of 1929 followed partly from the failures of the Communist regime, whose inability to properly regulate the quasi-market of NEP had created a seeming imperative for even greater anti-market measures—which exacerbated the problems, requiring still greater emergency measures. Anticapitalism, the root cause of the problems, was imagined to be the solution. Carr accentuated the “haphazard and impulsive character of the final decision” in late 1929, but failed to elucidate the worldview and governing ideas behind the regime’s improvisation. Carr, “Revolution from Above,” 327. For an alternative development vision, see Antisferov et al., Russian Agriculture, 384. On the scholarly debate, see Harrison, “Why Was NEP Abandoned?”
8. Lenin had written: “Either we must bring the small bourgeoisie under our control (which can be done by organizing the poor), or they will overthrow . . . the workers’ government just as inevitably and unavoidably as the Napoleons . . . , figures who are bound to develop in a soil permeated with petit-bourgeois mentality.” Sochineniia, XXII: 515 (pre-1934). See also Valentinov, “Sut’ bolshevizma v izobrazhenii Iu. Piatakova”; and Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 415–6.
9. Volkogonov, Stalin: politicheskii portret, I: 307.
10. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 407–20.
11. Word of the Kamenev-Bukharin meeting had already appeared in the Menshevik Sotsialisticheskii vestnik [Berlin], Jan. 20, 1929. Three days later, the leaflet “The Party with Closed Eyes Is Leading the Way to a New Catastrophe” appeared; it was signed “Bolsheviks-Leninists” (the Trotskyite self-designation) and quoted Kamenev’s “notes.” Danilov and Khlevniuk, Kak lomali NEP, IV: 558–63 (RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 40, l. 2–11: Kamenev’s “notes”), 564–5 (l. 12–3: Kamenev to Orjonikidze, Jan. 27), 566–7 (l. 14–5: Sokolnikov to Orjonikidze, Jan. 28), 568–71 (l. 17–24: Tomsky to Orjonikidze, Jan. 14), 572–6 (l. 25–31: Bukharin to Orjonikidze, Jan. 30), 607, 613–5. See also Vaganov, Pravyi uklon, 199–202; Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 417; and Fel’shtinskii, Razgovory s Bukharinym, 30–7. A copy of the “notes” is in the Trotsky Papers at Harvard (T1897); it is presumed to have fallen into Trotsky’s hands from F. P. Schwalbe, Kamenev’s secretary. The Russian original, from leaflets, was published in Sotsialistchekii vestnik (May 4, 1929). Fel’shtinskii, “Dva epizoda iz istorii vnutripartiinoi bor’by.”
12. Stalin, “Gruppa Bukharina i pravyi uklon v nashei partii,” Sochineniia, XI: 318–25; Danilov and Khlevniuk, Kak lomali NEP, IV: 577–601. Stalin, ever magnanimous, proposed including Bukharin on the commission to prepare his apology; Bukharin declined, then agreed, but the commission met without him. Danilov and Khlevniuk, Kak lomali NEP, IV: 597. See also Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution, 352.
13. Danilov and Khlevniuk, Kak lomali NEP, 540–8 (resolutions of the joint session Feb. 9, 1929, approved at the April 23, 1929, plenum); VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh (1933), II: 515; KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh (7th ed.), II: 566–7. Bukharin had instigated at least two further meetings with Kamenev, one together with Pyatakov, and a second with Tomsky, and published a pointed reminder of Lenin’s Testament in Pravda (Jan. 24, 1929). Jules Humbert-Droz, the Swiss Communist who met Bukharin in early 1929, later claimed that Bukharin mentioned getting rid of Stalin. Humbert-Droz, Mémoirs, 356, 379–80. “Bukharin,” Carr and Davies wrote, “lacked altogether the astuteness and organizing skill of the politician.” Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, II: 76.
14. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 180 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 7, l. 26: Jan. 10, 1929).
15. Cristian Rakovski, too, managed to carry trunks of official documents with him into internal exile. Fischer, Men and Politics, 129.
16. After the Ilich had docked at Istanbul, Trotsky was handed $1,500, and put up temporarily in two rooms inside the consulate. Stalin, Trotsky concluded, “was created by the epoch, by the bureaucracy, by the revolution’s fall from grace, in order to effect and embody that fall, that degeneration.” Trotsky attributed his own defeat to a conspiracy against him. Trotskii, “Kak moglo eto sluchit’sia?” in Chto i kak proizoshlo, 25–36.
17. Trotskii, Dnevnik i pis’ma, 46–8. On the politeness of the consul staff toward Trotsky, see Serge and Sedova, Life and Death of Trotsky, 163.
