Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 полностью

238. Rakovski gave a similar incisive analysis from exile that was also published abroad. Braginskaia, “Pobeda plana i rekord besplannovosti”; Rakovski, “Na s”ezde i v strane”; Filtzer, Soviet Workers, 39–41. See also Lewin, “Disappearance of Planning.”

239. Filtzer, Soviet Workers, 37, citing Severenyi rabochii, April 15, 1930, and Za industrializatsiiu, July 20, 1930.

240. Filtzer, Soviet Workers, 38, 43.

241. He instructed Molotov (Aug. 6, 1930) to “pay attention to the Stalingrad and Leningrad [Putilov] tractor factories. Things are bad there.” Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 200–1, 201n8 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 793, l. 3).

242. Stalin singled out by name Ivan Klimenko. Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 202, 203n2 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 793, l. 21–3, 7).

243. In Stalin’s absence the politburo had twice examined the South Caucasus party infighting; he demanded that a damning politburo decree be published in full. Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 202, 203n3 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 790, l. l. 8; d. 791, l. 23, 24: July 20, Aug. 3, 1930).

244. In 1929 and the first half of 1930, Kalinin’s central executive committee had received an astonishing 172,500 petitions of wrongful dekulakization (337,563 households would be dekulakized in 1930); Kalinin’s secretariat managed to adjudicate just 785 of them (ruling in the plaintiff’s favor 519 times). “Rol’ OGPU v raskulachivanii krest’ianskih khoziaistv”: http://helion-ltd.ru/ogpu-role.

245. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 7 (RGASPI, f. 85, recent acquisitions, d. 2, l. 1–11, 28–30); Khlevniuk, Khoziain, 31.

246. In a follow-up letter of Sept. 2, Stalin put Kalinin on the same plane as Rykov. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 198–202, 211–3; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 203–4, 210–1.

247. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 198–202; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 203–4. The next day, on the basis of Mikoyan’s reports on successful procurements, Stalin demanded still more exports, writing to Molotov, “Otherwise we risk being left without our new iron and steel and machine-building factories (Nizhny Novgorod auto factory, Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, etc.).” Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 200–1, 201n8 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 793, l. 3: Aug. 6, 1930).

248. Dohan, “Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky,” 615–6; Tracy, Agriculture in Western Europe, 127; Davies, Socialist Offensive, 107. See also Course and Phases of the World Economic Depression, 167ff.

249. Stalin also felt that Mikoyan was not coping as trade commissar (“a job that is difficult, if not impossible, for one person to handle”), and proposed he be removed or given an outstanding deputy, suggesting Arkady Rozenholz, a member of the Central Control Commission. The politburo formally appointed Rozengolts deputy trade commissar for foreign trade on Sept. 10. On Nov. 15, 1930, trade was redivided into two commissariats, and Rozenholz became commissar for foreign trade. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 202–6; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 204–6, 206n7 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 796, l. 9; d. 804, l. 6). Prices for other Soviet exports fell by 20 percent.

250. Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 1918–1966, 20.

251. Timber exports, which had only resumed in 1927, would attain 18 percent of the world market in 1931; imperial Russia had had 15 percent of the world timber market in 1913. The USSR targeted the United States, Italy, Germany, and Britain; the British market for Soviet raw materials opened in April 1930.

252. Potocki, Polityka państwa polskiego, 262–72; Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 102 (citing CAW I/303/4/6982).

253. To pay for this new expense, he instructed Molotov to “raise the money through an increase in the production of vodka.” Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 209–10; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 208–10; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 31. In short order, the politburo enacted his will. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 796, l. 7 (Sept. 25, 1930).

254. An estimated 3,000 engineers had been arrested in the Donbass in 1928–29. “Over the last several years we liquidated counterrevolutionary organizations almost in every sphere of the economy,” the OGPU reported in May 1930. Sevost’ianov et al., “Sovershenno sekretno,” VIII/ii: 1140 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, por. 435, l. 169–241).