365. Cohen, Bukharin, 315, 60–106; von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, 335. Bukharin, according to his biographer, perceived that Voroshilov wavered, at least in 1930. But if so, that passed. Cohen, Bukharin, 287, 289. Voroshilov, at the 16th Party Congress, on July 2, 1930, found it necessary to deny that any wavering had taken place inside the Red Army (“not one, not one case”). XVI s”ezd VKP (b), 504–16, reprinted in Voroshilov, Stat’i i rechi, 434–50 (at 444). According to Reese, many lower-level Red Army party cells sympathized with the right’s program of voluntary collectivization and higher state prices for grain, though it is unclear whether they also supported individual household farming. Reese, “Red Army Opposition,” esp. 37. On rumors about the army, see Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 121–2.
CHAPTER 2. APOCALYPSE
1. Starkov, Martem’ian Ryutin, 259. “O dele tak nazyvaemogo ‘Soiuza Marksistov-Lenintsev,’” 103–15; “Platforma ‘Soiuza Marksistov-Lenintsev’ (‘Gruppa Riutina’): ‘Stalin i krzis proletarskoi diktatury.’” There are some hints that the texts underwent changes as they were circulated from hand to hand (105). The party archives contain no originals of either document. The version that is extant is purported to be a copy of the original “certified” and signed by “First Operational Commissar of the Special Political Department (SPO) of the OGPU, Bogan.” Whether the police made insertions cannot be established.
2. Bix, Hirohito, 209–10 (citing Bonner F. Fellers Collection, Hoover Institution Archives: Answer to Japan, Southwest Pacific Area, July 1, 1944: 9).
3. On July 25, 1930, the politburo had decreed that by late Sept. 1931, collectivization would reach 65–70 percent in the chief grain growing areas, and 35–40 percent elsewhere, but just 15–20 percent in the grain deficit territories. The regime significantly raised taxes on individual family farms and curtailed the land available to them. Officials also engaged in arbitrary confiscations of seed grain, implements, and other property “for the good of the collectives.” Many peasants just gave up and headed for the factory construction sites. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 1 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 790, l. 13), 14 (RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 193, l. 99).
4. Pravda, Dec. 22, 1930; VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh (1933), II: 675–92; Davies, Socialist Offensive, 380–1. On the plenum’s eve, Kaganovich had exhorted the Moscow party organization to “struggle against excesses, but in that lies the whole trick, the whole art of the Bolshevik leadership’s Marxism-Leninism, to be able, without excesses, to double and triple collectivization.” Kir’ianov, “Kollektivizatsiia tsentra Rossii,” 79 (citing RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 139, l. 74: Dec. 1930).
5. Ivnitskii, Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie, 167 (citing former politburo archive, without details).
6. VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh (1933), II: 677–8; Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution, 263. The 1931 plan itself was printed in just 1,200 copies, for internal circulation only: Narodno-khoziaistvennyi plan na 1931 god: kontrol’nye tsifry (Moscow: 1931).
7. Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution, 109–13. Benito Mussolini, in 1912, then a member of the Italian Socialist Party, had written: “We want to believe in [socialism], we must believe in it, humanity needs a credo. It is faith which moves mountains because it gives the illusion that mountains move. Illusion is perhaps the only reality in life.” Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle, 43 (citing Avanti! June 18, 1912, reprinted in Mussolini, Opera Omnia, IV: 173–4).
8. Lyons was most impressed with the pithy slogans, such as “Five-in-Four,” which he noted was instantly understood to refer to the Five-Year Plan and its early attainment, and judged “as effective as our 4-out-of-5 for toothpaste.” Lyons, Moscow Carrousel, 209. See also Mikhutina, “SSSR glazami pol’skikh diplomatov,” 46; and Sukhanov, Zapiski, III: 214.
