354. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo
355. Stalin’s personal secretariat appears to have moved from party HQ on Old Square to Government HQ in the Kremlin at the beginning of the 1930s. Rosenfeldt, “‘The Consistory of the Communist Church,’” 318n31, citing Robert Tucker, personal communication. The move displaced some offices of the central executive committee from the Kremlin to the GUM department store across Red Square. Kvashonkin,
356. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 851, l. 15.
357. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 4, d. 667. See also Kolesnik,
358. Ilizarov,
359. “Chto dal’she,”
360. In another private letter of March 1930, Bakhmeteff foresaw the consequences as well (“agricultural catastrophe . . . famine on a great scale”). Bakhmeteff also understood that Stalin would succeed in asserting state control over the countryside, whatever the human and economic costs (“that is second order from the point of view of Communist political goals”). He concluded: “A regime that forms in such conditions can only be compared with a military occupation by an armed external enemy.” Budnitskii,
361. Trotsky would later write in his diary that back in 1926, Kamenev had warned him that his life was in danger, and that Zinoviev had told him, “Do you think that Stalin has not discussed the question of your physical removal?” Trotsky did not record these alleged conversations at the time, and neither Kamenev nor Zinoviev ever stated as much publicly. Trotskii,
362. Khlevniuk rightly pointed out that Stalin’s victory over Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky required significant effort, but he did not specify whether another outcome was possible.
363. Mikoian,
364. Tomsky conceded to the 16th Party Congress: “Any opposition, any struggle against the party line under the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . will inevitably find a response outside the party. And whatever the opposition’s platform may be . . . it will become the organizational nucleus for a third force, for the enemies of the proletarian dictatorship.” Rykov told the delegates: “Any utilization of our difficulties for criticism of the party general line must automatically include an appeal for the support of the petit bourgeois elements against the socialist elements of the countryside.”