Such attitudes are a mistake. Russia can be one of two things: despotic, aggressive and dangerous; or a democratic, strategic ally. The West can never be safe with an authoritarian Russian bear. Such a bear will forever be in search of prey, inventing external enemies on whom to blame internal failures and to rally the Russian people around its leadership. Russian authoritarianism will always be belligerent and aggressive. Its modus operandi will always be messianism, militarism and adventurism. It has no possibility of internal stability; it can be stable only when it is thrusting aggressively outwards. Such is the fate of all empires that refuse to transform themselves into a nation-state.
The paradox is that a weak Russia will seek to assert its strength, to take what it wants by force, to breach the rules of civilised behaviour; while a strong, confident Russia possesses the self-belief to focus on its own problems at home and play by the rules abroad. The security of the West can be assured only if Russia is strong and democratically governed. The West, ironically, needs to encourage a worthy competitor in Russia if it wants to be certain of its own safety. It may seem counterintuitive, but it will be worth it: Europe’s choice is between Russia as a difficult but civilised competitor and Russia as an aggressor, threatening the foundations of European civilisation. Despotism in Russia will always be a threat, no matter how much Europe tries to convince itself otherwise. That is why it is in Europe’s interest to help Russia become a modern, civilised country with a stable economy and predictable policies.
Russia cannot become a modern country while it maintains its current archaic system of governance. It is a burden that weighs it down, condemning the nation to stagnation in industrial or even pre-industrial conditions, while fostering dissatisfaction among society’s most productive forces with their country’s lack of development. The exodus abroad of the most active and educated members of Russian society exacerbates the problem, as the economy suffers from their loss. Like all authoritarian regimes, Putin’s answer is even more foreign aggression, to keep Europe always on the defensive, and – following the invasion of Ukraine – on the brink of war.
If the West wants to protect itself from the threat from the East, it would be a mistake to try to weaken or break up Russia. The consequences of that would be an internal power struggle in Russia with a predictable outcome – power would be seized by the toughest, most unprincipled autocrat who, in order to maintain his position, would inevitably provoke a confrontation with the West. If this is to be avoided, we need democratic states in the East and West to work together. Competing and collaborating with a strong Russia is a much better solution for everyone. As a geographic neighbour and sister civilisation, a future Russia can either be part of the problem or she can become part of the solution to much bigger problems. The creation of a Russian civic state is the greatest goal towards which the people of Russia have laboured historically, but it is yet to be achieved. With greater informational freedom, the internet, social media, international travel and an increasingly integrated world community, that task is now possible.
CHAPTER 18
EXPANSIONIST DREAMS
Whatever politicians may say, the foreign policy agenda of all nations is based on self-interest. Political leaders may declare they are taking action to support other nations and help right moral wrongs, but altruism is rarely the true motivation.
When the West sent support to the anti-Assad opposition in Syria, it was a gamble aimed at shoring up its own presence there. When Vladimir Putin sent the Russian military to defend Assad, he was doing the same. This was not a moral crusade, but an East–West arm wrestle. The difference was that Putin played things more ruthlessly and with greater purpose, and his aims were less the interests of the Russian state than the venal self-interest of his clique of cronies. Western leaders, on the other hand, were constrained by pressure from parliaments and critical voices at home, in ways that Putin was not.
Putin’s aim is always to secure for himself and his entourage a strong position in relations with the West, which will allow him to maintain his grip on power in Russia without criticism of the methods he uses, to legitimise his authority at home through recognition abroad and to persuade Russian citizens that the country is surrounded by hostile forces. The West allowed him to do this. The US withdrew from Syria, leaving the field to the forces of the Kremlin, while American wavering on the future of NATO left the Baltic countries and others in anxious limbo. NATO may have advanced to Russia’s doorstep, but it no longer constrains the Kremlin.
