In August 1915, Nicholas took two decisions which many contemporaries regarded as a death sentence on the dynasty. One was to dismiss Nikolai Nikolaevich and assume personal command of Russia’s armed forces. The other was to prorogue the Duma.
It is difficult to ascertain what moved Nicholas to take over the military command, for he made the decision in private and persisted in it, without explanation, in the face of solid opposition from most of his family and virtually the entire cabinet. A year earlier he had let himself be dissuaded from such a course; now he grew intransigent. One indubitable factor was concern for his beloved army. He may also have wished to inspire the country in the hour of its severe trials, and set an example by sharing the simple life of a soldier. Perhaps he also thought that his action would calm the political turmoil and put an end to rumors of a separate peace. He received vigorous support from his wife, behind whom loomed the sinister figure of Rasputin. Alexandra, for all her love and devotion to Nicholas, thought him a weakling, too soft to stand up to the politicians: with him away at the front, she could look forward to enhanced political influence with which to defend the monarchy’s prerogatives.
In this endeavor she was seconded by Rasputin. Rasputin, who is sometimes called a “mad monk,” was neither mad nor a monk. A peasant from western Siberia who probably belonged to the outlawed Khlysty sect, he was introduced to the Imperial family in 1905 by Nikolai Nikolaevich. He quickly gained their confidence with his ability, which probably involved hypnosis, to stop the bleeding of the hemophiliac Tsarevich. He also posed, with some success, as a “man of the people,” an unlettered but genuine voice of the Russian masses, who the Imperial couple liked to believe were staunchly royalist. Although his connections at the Court enabled him to behave with growing brazenness, until the fall of 1915 he had no political influence. Rumors of his boasting, drinking, and sexual escapades reached the Court, but both Nicholas and his wife dismissed them as the malicious gossip of their enemies.
It was very much in Rasputin’s interest to have Nicholas out of the way. In encouraging Nicholas to leave for the front, he thought of the influence and the money which would then lie within his reach. He knew that Nicholas tolerated him for familial reasons, but neither liked nor trusted him. With Nicholas out of sight, he could manipulate the Empress and become the regime’s
If we cannot be entirely certain what caused Nicholas to assume command of the army, we know well why his advisers opposed his doing so. The Council of Ministers feared that the Tsar would jeopardize his prestige by taking charge of the army when its fortunes were at their lowest ebb. If, as was likely, further misfortunes befell the troops, the Tsar would bear personal blame.84 Second, Nicholas had a reputation for being “unlucky”: born on Job’s name day, his coronation marred by the Khodynka tragedy, father to a single male heir who suffered from an incurable malady, he had lost the Japanese war and was the first Russian Tsar to surrender autocratic authority. What inspired confidence that a man with such a record could lead Russia to victory? Last, but not least, apprehensions arose that with Nicholas at the front, power would pass into the hands of the “German” Empress and her disreputable confidant.
Such considerations moved all those who had his interests at heart, except for Alexandra and Goremykin, to implore Nicholas to reconsider. Among them were the Empress Dowager, Polivanov, and Rodzianko, the latter of whom called this “the worst mistake” of Nicholas’s reign.85 On August 21, the Council of Ministers sent Nicholas a collective letter begging him not to go through with his decision. Signed by most of the ministers, Goremykin excepted, it warned that the move “threaten[ed] … with serious consequences Russia, your person, and your dynasty.” The eight signatories concluded that they were unable to continue working with Goremykin and “were losing faith in the possibility of serving [the Tsar] and the Fatherland in a useful manner.”86
