Two days before his scheduled departure for the front, Nicholas met with the cabinet. Once again the ministers pleaded with him to change his mind. Nicholas, clutching an ikon and perspiring profusely, listened, then rose to his feet and said: “I have heard what you have to say, but I adhere to my decision.”87 For the time being, he kept the rebellious ministers at their posts, despite their desire to be relieved, only to purge later those who had waxed especially eloquent on this occasion.
On August 22, Nicholas departed for Mogilev, where he was to remain, except for brief visits to the family, until late December of the following year. Here, he led a quiet, modest life which suited him better than the formality of the Court. He attended daily briefings, but did not interfere with military decisions, which he left to the chief of staff, General Alekseev, the actual Commander in Chief.*
By departing, Nicholas escaped the political storm raging in the capital. Throughout August, the metropolitan press waged a relentless campaign against Goremykin, demanding his replacement by a Prime Minister chosen by the Duma. Some newspapers carried lists of a putative “national” cabinet, similar to the one that would actually assume power in February 1917.88
The political crisis came to a head on August 25, when the Progressive Bloc, now numbering 300 out of the Duma’s 420 deputies, made public a nine-point program.89 Out of deference to the Nationalists, it was more moderate than many signatories would have liked, but it was an audacious document nevertheless. Its first and foremost demand was for a ministry that would enjoy “the confidence of the nation” and promptly agree with the legislature on a “definite program”—a demand that fell short of calling for a ministry chosen by the Duma and accountable to it. Next came a list of proposed measures subjecting the bureaucracy to legal restraints, eliminating the division of authority between the military and civilian administrations in matters not directly related to military operations, setting free political and religious prisoners, abolishing disabilities on religious minorities, including the Jews, granting autonomy to Poland and political concessions to the Finns and Ukrainians, restoring trade unions, and reviewing many existing laws.90 It was to a large extent the platform that the Provisional Government would adopt on coming to power in March 1917. Thus, in terms of both personnel and program, the first revolutionary government may be said to have been conceived as early as August 1915, when tsarism was still in charge and revolution seemed a remote prospect.
The program of the Progressive Bloc had strong reverberations.91 The Council of Ministers came out in favor of negotiations with the bloc to determine the feasibility of a compromise. Most of the ministers were prepared to step down and give way to a new cabinet.92 The Council acted in defiance of Goremykin, who consulted regularly with the Empress and agreed with her that it would be best to request the Tsar to prorogue the Duma.
An extraordinary situation thus emerged in the last days of August 1915: liberal and conservative legislators, representing nearly three-quarters of a Duma elected on a very conservative franchise, made common cause with the highest officials appointed by the Tsar to call for the introduction of parliamentary democracy. Little wonder that the educated classes were seized with euphoria.93
Nicholas, however, refused to surrender the power to appoint ministers, and this for two reasons, one practical, the other theoretical or moral. He did not believe that the intellectuals likely to fill ministerial posts in a parliamentary cabinet would know how to administer the country. He also convinced himself (or perhaps was convinced by his wife) that on the day of his coronation in 1896 he had sworn to uphold autocracy. In fact, he did nothing of the kind. The coronation ceremony demanded of him only a prayer in which no reference was made to the mode of government and the word “autocracy” (
