His desire to placate the left was evident not only in the failure to carry out the promised military reforms but also in the refusal to take resolute measures against the Bolsheviks. Although he had in hand a great deal of damning evidence, he failed to prosecute the leaders of the July putsch in deference to the Ispolkom and the Soviet, which regarded the charges against the Bolsheviks as “counterrevolutionary.” He showed a similar bias in reacting to a proposal from the Ministry of War to take into custody both right-wing and left-wing “saboteurs” of Russia’s war effort. He approved the list of right-wingers to be arrested, but hesitated when coming to the other list, from which he eventually struck more than half the names. When the document reached the Minister of the Interior, the SR N. D. Avksentev, whose countersignature it required, the latter reconfirmed the first list, but crossed out from the second all but two of the remaining names (Trotsky’s and Kollontai’s).13
Kerensky was a very ambitious man who saw himself destined to lead democratic Russia. His only opportunity to realize this ambition was to take charge of the democratic left—that is, the Mensheviks and SRs—and to do so he had to pander to its obsessive fear of the “counterrevolution.” He not only saw but needed to see Kornilov as the focus of all the anti-democratic forces. Although he well knew what the Bolsheviks had intended with their armed “demonstrations” of April, June, and July, and could have easily determined what Lenin and Trotsky planned for the future, he persuaded himself that Russian democracy faced danger not from the left but from the right. Since he was neither uninformed nor unintelligent, this absurd assessment makes sense only if one assumes that it suited him politically. Having cast Kornilov in the role of the Russian Bonaparte, he reacted uncritically—indeed, eagerly—to rumors of a vast counterrevolutionary conspiracy allegedly being hatched by Kornilov’s friends and supporters.14
Precious days went by without the military reforms being enacted. Knowing that the Germans intended soon to resume offensive operations and hoping to stir things up, Kornilov requested permission to meet with the cabinet. He arrived in the capital on August 3. Addressing the ministers, he began with a survey of the status of the armed forces. He wanted to discuss military reforms, but Savinkov interrupted him, saying that the War Ministry was working on this matter. Kornilov then turned to the situation at the front and reported on the operations he was preparing against the Germans and Austrians. At this point, Kerensky leaned over and asked him in a whisper to be careful;15 moments later a similar warning came from Savinkov. This incident had a shattering effect on Kornilov and on his attitude toward the Provisional Government: he referred to it time and again as justification for his subsequent actions. As he correctly interpreted Kerensky’s and Savinkov’s warnings, one or more ministers were under suspicion of leaking military secrets. When he returned to Mogilev, Kornilov, still in a state of shock, told Lukomskii what had happened and asked what kind of government he thought was running Russia.16 He concluded that the minister about whom he had been warned was Chernov, who was believed to convey confidential information to colleagues in the Soviet, the Bolsheviks included.17 From that day on, Kornilov regarded the Provisional Government as unworthy to lead the nation.*
Not long after these events (on August 6 or 7), Kornilov ordered General A. M. Krymov, the commander of the Third Cavalry Corps, to move his troops from the Romanian sector northward, and, reinforced with other units, take up positions at Velikie Luki, a city in western Russia roughly equidistant from Moscow and Petrograd. The Third Corps consisted of two Cossack divisions and the so-called Native (or Savage) Division from the Caucasus, all undermanned (the Native Division had a mere 1,350 men) but regarded as dependable. Puzzled by these instructions, Lukomskii pointed out that Velikie Luki was too far from the front for these forces to be used against the Germans. Kornilov replied that he wanted the corps to be in position to suppress a potential Bolshevik putsch in either Moscow or Petrograd. He assured Lukomskii they were not intended against the Provisional Government, adding that if it proved necessary, Krymov’s troops would disperse the Soviet, hang its leaders, and make short shrift of the Bolsheviks—with or without the government’s consent.18 He also told Lukomskii that Russia desperately needed “firm authority” capable of saving the country and its armed forces:
