Savinkov next turned to the subject of measures to deal with the anticipated Bolshevik coup. The Prime Minister wished to withdraw Petrograd and its suburbs from the Petrograd Military District and place it under his direct command. Kornilov was displeased by this request, but yielded. Since one could not predict the reaction of the Soviet to the proposed military reforms and in view of the anticipated Bolshevik putsch, Savinkov went on, it was desirable to reinforce the Petrograd garrison with reliable combat troops. He requested Kornilov in two days to move the Third Cavalry Corps from Velikie Luki to the vicinity of Petrograd, where it would come under the government’s command; as soon as this was done, he was to notify Petrograd by telegraph. If necessary, he said, the government was prepared to carry out “merciless” action against the Bolsheviks and, should it side with them, the Petrograd Soviet as well. To this request Kornilov readily assented.
Kornilov also agreed to ask the Union of Officers at headquarters to move to Moscow, but he refused to do away with the Political Department. He further promised to liquidate any anti-government plots at headquarters that might come to his attention.32
In the morning of August 24, as he was about to depart for Petrograd, Savinkov made two additional requests. Although Kerensky would later make much of Kornilov’s failure to carry them out, it is known from Savinkov’s recollections that they were made on his own initiative.33 One was that General Krymov be replaced as commander of the Third Corps before its dispatch to Petrograd: Krymov’s “reputation,” in Savinkov’s opinion, could create “undesirable complications.” The other was that the Native Division be detached from the Third Corps on the grounds that it would be embarrassing to have Caucasian natives “liberate” the capital of Russia.
Did Kornilov see through Kerensky’s deception? From his words and deeds one would have to conclude that he took the Prime Minister’s instructions at face value, unaware that the true object of Kerensky’s apprehension was not the Bolsheviks but he himself. As they were saying goodbye, Kornilov assured Savinkov that he intended to support Kerensky because the country needed him.34 For all his faults, Kerensky was a true patriot, and to Kornilov patriotic socialists were a valuable asset.
Following Savinkov’s departure, Kornilov issued orders to General Krymov, whom he retained in his post:
1. In the event you receive from me or directly on the spot information that the Bolshevik uprising has begun, you are to move without delay with the corps to Petrograd, occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which have joined the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd, and disperse the Soviet.
2. Having carried out this mission, General Krymov is to detach one brigade with artillery to Oranienbaum; following the arrival there, he is to demand of the Kronshtadt garrison to disarm the fortress and relocate to the mainland.35
The two assignments implemented Kerensky’s instructions. The first—to dispatch the Cavalry Corps to Petrograd—followed the request delivered orally by Savinkov. The second—to disarm Kronshtadt—was in line with Kerensky’s orders issued on August 8 but never carried out.36 Both missions were to protect the Provisional Government from the Bolsheviks. Kornilov may be said to have shown insubordination in retaining Krymov as commander of the Third Cavalry Corps: in justification, he explained to Lukomskii that the government feared Krymov would be too harsh in dealing with the rebels, but it would be grateful to him when it was all over.37 Lukomskii wondered whether the instructions brought by Savinkov were not some kind of trap: Kornilov dismissed these doubts, saying that Lukomskii was “too suspicious.”38
At this time, Kornilov was approached by officers who said they had in Petrograd 2,000 men willing to help suppress the Bolsheviks. They requested from Kornilov 100 officers to lead them: Kornilov promised to provide these men. He said that all should be in readiness by August 26, the earliest of the dates for the anticipated Bolshevik coup, so that when the Bolsheviks rose, at the approach of Krymov’s cavalry the volunteers could seize Smolnyi, the seat of the Soviet.39
60. Vladimir Lvov.
Savinkov reported to Kerensky on August 25 that all his instructions would be carried out.
