Thanks to the availability of the tapes, it can be established that the two men talked at cross-purposes. As concerned Kornilov, all that he had confirmed to Kerensky posing as Lvov was that he had, indeed, invited Kerensky and Savinkov to Mogilev. Kerensky interpreted Kornilov’s confirmation to mean—without any warrant except such as provided by his fevered imagination—that Kornilov intended to take him prisoner and proclaim himself dictator. It was an omission of monumental proportions on Kerensky’s part not to inquire directly or even obliquely whether Kornilov had in fact given Lvov for transmittal a three-point ultimatum. In the conversation with Kerensky, Kornilov said nothing about the cabinet resigning and full military and civilian power being placed in his hands. From Kornilov’s words—“Yes, I confirm that I asked you [i.e., Lvov] to transmit my urgent request to Aleksandr Fedorovich to come to Mogilev”—Kerensky chose to infer that the three political conditions presented to him by Lvov were authentic as well. When Filonenko saw the tapes, he observed that “Kerensky never stated what he was asking and Kornilov never knew to what he was responding.”* Kerensky believed that by impersonating Lvov he was communicating with Kornilov in an understandable code, whereas he was speaking in riddles. The best that can be said in defense of the Prime Minister’s behavior is that he was overwrought. But the suspicion lurks that he heard exactly what he wanted to hear.
On the basis of such flimsy evidence, Kerensky decided on an open break with Kornilov. When Lvov belatedly turned up, he had him placed under arrest.† Ignoring Savinkov’s pleas that before doing anything precipitous he communicate once again with Kornilov to clear up what in Savinkov’s mind was an obvious misunderstanding, Kerensky called a cabinet meeting for midnight. He told the ministers what had transpired and requested “full authority”—that is, dictatorial powers—to enable him to deal with the military coup d’état. The ministers agreed that one had to stand up to the “general-conspirator” and that Kerensky should enjoy full powers to deal with the emergency. Accordingly, they tendered their resignations, which Nekrasov interpreted to mean that the Provisional Government had, in effect, ceased to exist.54 Kerensky emerged from the meeting as nominal dictator. After the cabinet adjourned at 4 a.m. on August 27, no more regular cabinet meetings were held, decisions from now until October 26 being taken by Kerensky acting alone or in consultation with Nekrasov and Tereshchenko. In the early hours of the morning, either with or without the approval of the ministers—most likely on his personal authority—Kerensky sent Kornilov a telegram dismissing him and ordering him to report at once to Petrograd. Until his replacement had been named, General Lukomskii was to serve as Commander in Chief.* By breaking with Kornilov, Kerensky could pose as champion of the Revolution: according to Nekrasov, during the night meeting of the cabinet, Kerensky said, “I will not give them the Revolution”55—as if it were his to give or keep.
While these events were taking place, Kornilov, ignorant of Kerensky’s interpretation of their brief exchange, proceeded with preparations to help the government suppress the anticipated Bolshevik rising. At 2:40 a.m. he cabled Savinkov:
The corps is assembling in the environs of Petrograd toward evening August 28. Request that Petrograd be placed under martial law August 29.56
If any more proof is needed that Kornilov did not engage in a military putsch, this cable should furnish it: for surely if he were ordering the Third Corps to Petrograd to unseat the government, he would hardly have forewarned the government by telegraph. It is even less credible that he would have entrusted his alleged coup to a subordinate. Zinaida Gippius, pondering the mystery of the Kornilov Affair a few days after its occurrence, asked herself the obvious question: “How was it that Kornilov
