There can be little doubt that the three “conditions” attributed by Lvov to Kornilov had been concocted by him and his friends in order to force the issue: they did not reflect Kornilov’s answer to what he had been told were questions posed to him by the Prime Minister. But they were just what Kerensky needed to break Kornilov. In order to obtain incontrovertible proof of Kornilov’s conspiracy, Kerensky decided for the time being to play along. He invited Lvov to meet him at 8 p.m. in the office of the Minister of War to communicate with the general by telegraph.
Lvov, who spent the interval with Miliukov, was late. At 8:30, having kept Kornilov waiting for half an hour, Kerensky initiated a telegraphic conversation, in the course of which he impersonated the absent Lvov. He hoped, he said later, with this deception to obtain either a confirmation of Lvov’s ultimatum or else a “bewildered” denial.
What follows is the complete text of this celebrated exchange as recorded on telegraphic tapes:
Kerensky: Prime Minister on the line. We are waiting for General Kornilov.
Kornilov: General Kornilov on the line.
Kerensky: How do you do, General. V. N. Lvov and Kerensky are on the line. We ask you to confirm that Kerensky can act in accordance with the information conveyed to him by Vladimir Nikolaevich.
Kornilov: How do you do, Aleksandr Fedorovich. How do you do, Vladimir Nikolaevich. To confirm once again the outline of the situation I believe the country and the army are in, an outline which I sketched out to Vladimir Nikolaevich with the request that he should report it to you, let me declare once more that the events of the last few days and those already in the offing make it imperative to reach a completely definite decision in the shortest possible time.
Kerensky [impersonating Lvov]: I, Vladimir Nikolaevich, am enquiring
Kornilov: Yes, I confirm that I asked you to transmit my urgent request to Aleksandr Fedorovich to
Kerensky: I, Aleksandr Fedorovich, take your reply to confirm the words reported to me by Vladimir Nikolaevich. It is impossible for me to do that and leave here today, but I hope to leave tomorrow. Will Savinkov be needed?
Kornilov: I urgently request that Boris Viktorovich come along with you. What I said to Vladimir Nikolaevich applies equally to Boris Viktorovich. I would beg you most sincerely not to postpone your departure beyond tomorrow …
Kerensky: Are we to come only if there are demonstrations, rumors of which are going around, or in any case?
Kornilov: In any case.
Kerensky: Goodbye. We shall meet soon.
Kornilov: Goodbye.51
This brief dialogue was a comedy of errors with the most tragic consequences. Kerensky later maintained—and he persisted in this version to the end of his life—that Kornilov had “affirmed not only Lvov’s authority to speak in Kornilov’s name, but confirmed also the accuracy of the words which Lvov had attributed to him”—namely, that he demanded dictatorial powers.52 But we know from eyewitnesses at the other end of the Hughes apparatus that when the conversation was over, Kornilov heaved a sigh of relief: Kerensky’s agreement to come to Mogilev meant to him that the Prime Minister was willing to work jointly on the formation of a new, “strong” government. Later that evening, Kornilov discussed with Lukomskii the composition of such a cabinet, in which both Kerensky and Savinkov would hold ministerial posts. He also sent telegrams to leading statesmen inviting them to join him and the Prime Minister in Mogilev.53
