The Third World War: August 1985 полностью

For the previous four days, NATO early warning had been affected by electronic interference from the other side of the German border. This was not unusual. It had been experienced increasingly during the current Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres and the early hours of 4 August showed no change. At 0345 COMAAFCE was woken from a fitful sleep in his command bunker in the Central Region’s war headquarters to be told of threatening developments on the other side of the border. Minutes later he reached his war room where the German Air Force (GAF) general on duty had positive information of a major Warsaw Pact penetration of NATO airspace under cover of heavy ECM. The general on duty reported that he had taken the initial war measures and aircraft were already being scrambled. Within another few minutes, reports of attacks on the Alliance missile belts, air defence radars and air bases began to come in. The war had begun.

Looking back when it was all over, surviving aircrew of both sides agreed that the first hours in the air over the Central Region had been indescribably chaotic. With the exception of a few grey-haired American colonels — veterans of South-east Asia — few-had ever fired a shot in anger or even heard one. The excitement, the danger and the general confusion of the air battle during the course of 4 August all contributed to what seemed utter chaos. Nevertheless, thanks to years of planning and thought there was in fact a coherent pattern underlying what was happening. A preliminary look at the records suggests that at 0800 hours on 4 August there were no less than 3,000 tactical aircraft airborne over the Central Region. Although the full story of the war must await a detailed analysis of combat reports and assessments, it is possible to describe the general trends at least in outline.

The counter-air offensive on Warsaw Pact airfields was launched the instant SACEUR gave authority for Allied aircraft to cross the border. The first aircraft to do so were USAF F-111s and GAF and RAF Tornados, flying at tree-top level from bases in the United Kingdom and West Germany. The effort was concentrated against airfields in East Germany, and a gratifyingly high percentage of the aircraft got to their targets. Confidence in their ability to get through heavy defences at very low level was immediately established among aircrew and commanders alike, and the very high speeds of the attacking aircraft at heights often below sixty metres undoubtedly achieved tactical surprise. The few engagements by Warsaw Pact fighters suggested a lack of confidence at ultra-low level and possibly some shortcomings in their look-down radars. It was also evident that the Russians had not solved the vexing problem of operating missiles and fighter aircraft in the same airspace.

It is not yet possible to make a quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of the counter-air offensive; but sufficient is known to say with certainty that, maintained as it was around the clock, it very seriously hindered the Warsaw Pact in achieving its main air objectives.

On the morning of 4 August, after consulting CINCENT and the ATAF and Army Group commanders, COMAAFCE allotted a major air effort to armed reconnaissance and interdiction of the battlefield approaches as soon as the main enemy thrust lines were identified. All the Jaguars, Harriers and AlphaJets in 2 ATAF were dedicated to this role, and in 4 ATAF the AlphaJets and US A-10s were similarly tasked. The French tactical air forces were mainly employed to the south in the 4 ATAF area, but only, on the orders of their government, in support of forces under French command.

When, later, the enemy’s main effort was identified as being in the north, and the war in the south began to stabilize, COMAAFCE progressively switched a proportion of 4 ATAF aircraft to operations in the NORTHAG-2 ATAF area; by the evening of 13 August 30 per cent of 4 ATAF offensive air support potential had been transferred to 2 ATAF. The crunch point in the Central Region air war was approaching.

At this point it can be seen that three factors had a decisive influence on air activity in support of the land battle. First, the weather throughout the region was uniformly good and the picture was only occasionally obscured by dawn mist and the odd rain shower; visibility, for the most part, was excellent, and the smoke and dust thrown up by the massive Soviet mechanized forces could be spotted from as far as thirty kilometres away. This was a wonderful help to the Harrier, Jaguar and A-10 crews. Second, as our land forces were pushed back, Allied pilots found themselves fighting over very familiar ground and the reaction time to army requests for support was thereby reduced.