War And Peace полностью

For what reason and in what way was battle offered and accepted at Shevardino and Borodino? Why did they join battle at Borodino? There was no sense in it for the French or the Russians. The immediate outcome was a clear inevitability: we Russians were brought one step closer towards the destruction of Moscow (the thing we dreaded most in all the world), and the French were brought one step closer towards the destruction of their entire army (the thing they dreaded most in all the world). At the time this outcome was as plain as a pikestaff, yet Napoleon offered battle and Kutuzov accepted.

If the military leaders had been guided by principles of reason it ought to have been clear to Napoleon that in marching nearly fifteen hundred miles and offering to fight, with a fair chance of losing a quarter of his men, he was heading for certain destruction, and it ought to have been just as clear to Kutuzov that in accepting the offer, also with a good chance of losing a quarter of his men, he was sure to lose Moscow. For Kutuzov it was a mathematical certainty, as clear as a game of draughts in which I am a piece down and if I go on exchanging pieces I am bound to lose, so I must avoid any exchanges. When my opponent has sixteen pieces and I have fourteen I am only one eighth weaker, but by the time we have exchanged thirteen pieces he will end up three times stronger than I am.

Before the battle of Borodino our forces were about five-sixths the strength of the French, but when it was over they were only half as strong; in other words before the battle a hundred thousand faced a hundred and twenty thousand, and when it was over fifty thousand faced a hundred thousand. Nevertheless, a leader as shrewd and experienced as Kutuzov took on the battle, which had been offered by Napoleon, who is generally described as a military genius, though it lost him a quarter of his men and extended his line of communications even further. It may be said that he thought he could end the campaign by taking Moscow, as he had done by taking Vienna, but there is a lot of evidence against this. Napoleon’s own historians tell us he had wanted to call a halt as far back as Smolensk, realizing how dangerously extended he was and knowing full well that the taking of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because he could see from Smolensk the dreadful state of the abandoned Russian towns, and he had received not a word of reply to repeated announcements of his desire to open negotiations.

The actions of Kutuzov and Napoleon in offering and accepting battle at Borodino were involuntary and meaningless. But later on, with the battle a fait accompli, historians have come forward with every kind of specious argument to demonstrate the foresight and genius of these generals, who of all the involuntary agents in the history of the world were surely the most enslaved and involuntary.

The ancients have left us examples of epics with all the historical interest focused on particular heroes, and nowadays we cannot get used to the idea that this kind of history is meaningless at the present stage of human development.

In response to the other question, of how battle was offered and accepted at Borodino and before that at Shevardino, there exists another clearly defined, universally familiar and totally false account. All the historians describe events as follows:

In retreat from Smolensk, they say, the Russian army scouted around to find the best location for a general engagement, and just such a location was discovered at Borodino. The Russians, they say, fortified this location in advance, on the left-hand side of the Moscow-Smolensk road and at right angles to it, all the way from Borodino to Utitsa, and that is where the battle was fought.

In front of this location, we are told, a fortified earthwork was thrown up on the rising ground at Shevardino as an outpost for the observation of enemy movements.

On the 24th, so the story goes, Napoleon attacked this outpost, and took it. On the 26th he attacked the whole Russian army, which had taken up position on the field of Borodino.

This is the historical version of events, and it is totally wrong, as anyone can tell if he is prepared to go into the matter.