The Russians did not scout round to find the best location; quite the reverse, as they retreated they had by-passed many locations better than Borodino. They did not take a stand at any of these positions, partly because Kutuzov refused to take up a position not chosen by himself personally, partly because the popular clamour for a battle was not yet strong enough, partly because Miloradovich had yet to arrive with the militia, and for lots of other reasons.
The fact is, there had been stronger positions earlier on, and the Borodino location where the battle took place was no improvement on anywhere else in the Russian empire that might have been chosen at random by sticking a pin into a map.
Far from fortifying a location on the left-hand side at right angles to the road, the place where the battle was fought, the Russians never even dreamt of fighting a battle on that spot until the 25th of August 1812. This is proved firstly by the fact that there were no fortifications there before the 25th, and the earthworks begun on that day had not been completed by the 26th; and secondly, proof is provided by the situation of the Shevardino redoubt itself, out in front of the battlefield, which rendered it valueless. For what purpose was this redoubt more strongly fortified than any other post? And for what purpose was every effort made and were six thousand men sacrificed to defend it until last thing on the 24th? A Cossack patrol would have been enough to keep track of enemy movements. And a third way of proving that the position of the battlefield was not anticipated, and the Shevardino redoubt was not an advance post of that position, lies in the fact that until the 25th Barclay de Tolly and Bagration were convinced that the Shevardino redoubt was the
What happened is clear. A location was chosen on the river Kolocha, which cuts across the high road not at ninety degrees, but at an acute angle, with the left flank at Shevardino, the right flank near the village of Novoye, and the centre at Borodino, near the confluence of the Kolocha and the Voyna. Anyone looking at the field of Borodino and disregarding the actual course of the battle would consider this location, conveniently covered by the Kolocha, the obvious one to be adopted by an army that wanted to check the advance of an enemy marching down the road from Smolensk towards Moscow.
Napoleon, riding towards Valuyevo on the 24th, did not (according to the history books) see the position of the Russians between Utitsa and Borodino (he could not have seen it since it didn’t exist), and did not see the advance posts of the Russian army, but in his pursuit of the Russian rearguard he stumbled upon the left flank of the Russian position at the Shevardino redoubt, and surprised the Russians by taking his troops across the Kolocha. And since it was too late for a general engagement the Russians withdrew the left flank from their intended position and took up a new one, which had not been anticipated and was not fortified. By crossing the Kolocha on the left-hand side of the road Napoleon shifted the whole battle-to-be from right to left (looked at from the Russian side) and transferred it to the fields that lie between Utitsa, Semyonovsk and Borodino – fields with nothing more to offer in the way of military advantage than any others in Russia – and it was here that the whole battle of the 26th took place.6
