The historian describing the campaign of 1813, or the restoration ffie Bourbons, says bluntly that these events were produced by the \ of Alexander. But the philosophic historian Gervinus, controverting ( view of the special historian of those events, seeks to prove that campaign of 1813 and the restoration of the Bourbons was due not 0 to Alexander, but also to the work of Stein, Metternich, Madame de St;, Talleyrand, Fichte, Chateaubriand, and others. The historian obviou, analyses the power of Alexander into component forces. Talleyra; Chateaubriand, and so on, and the sum of these component forces, t is, the effect on one another of Chateaubriand, Talleyrand, Madame ;i Stael, and others is obviously no,t equal to the resultant effect, that ^ the phenomenon of millions of Frenchman submitting to the Bourbo.i Such and such words being said to one another by Chateaubriand, IV.. dame de Stael, and others, only affects their relation to one another, al does not account for the submission of millions. And therefore to explJ how the submission of millions followed from their relation to one ; other, that is, how from component forces equal to a given quantity there followed a resultant equal to a thousand times A, the histori 1. is inevitably bound to admit that force of power, which he has renounc accepting it in the resultant force, that is, he is obliged to admit unexplained force that acts on the resultant of those components. A this is just what the philosophic historians do. And consequently tb not only contradict the writers of historical memoirs, but also contrad themselves.
Country people who have no clear idea of the cause of rain say, T: wind has blown away the rain, or the wind is blowing up for rain, ;| cording as they are in want of rain or of fair weather. In the same wq philosophic historians at times, when they wish it to be so, when it fits ; with their theory, say that power is the result of events; and at tim, when they want to prove something else, they say power produces t; events.
A third class of historians, the writers of the so-called history of ci ture, following on the lines laid down by the writers of universal histo who sometimes accept writers and ladies as forces producing events, } understand that force quite differently. They see that force in so-call culture, in intellectual activity. The historians of culture are quite co; sistent as regards their prototypes—the writers of universal history for if historical events can be explained by certain persons having sa certain things to one another, why not explain them by certain perso having written certain books? Out of all the immense number of toke that accompany every living phenomenon, these historians select t symptom of intellectual activity, and assert that this symptom is t cause. But in spite of all their endeavours to prove that the cause events lies in intellectual activity, it is only by a great stretch that 0 can agree that there is anything in common between intp actual activi
ncthe movement of peoples. And it is altogether impossible to admit aa intellectual activity has guided the actions of men, for such phe- oiena as the cruel murders of the French Revolution, resulting from teloctrinfe of the equality of man, and the most wicked wars and mas- ices arising from the Gospel of love, do not confirm this hypothesis.
]jt even admitting that all the cunningly woven arguments with which iee histories abound are correct, admitting that nations are governed y jme indefinite force called an idea —the essential question of history ;ilremains unanswered; or to the power of monarchs and the influence f tunsellors and other persons, introduced by the philosophic historian, niher new force is now joined—the idea, the connection of which with lenasses demands explanation. One can understand that Napoleon had osr and so an event came to pass; with some effort one can even con- sib that Napoleon together with other influences was the cause of an rut. But in what fashion a book, Le Contrat Social, led the French to a: each other to pieces cannot be understood without an explanation [ le causal connection of this new force with the event.
