here undoubtedly exists a connection between all the people living t ne time, and so it is possible to find some sort of connection between )iintellectual activity of men and their historical movements, just as n may find a connection between the movements of humanity and jmerce, handicrafts, gardening, and anything you like. But why in- ihctual activity should be conceived of by the historians of culture as i cause or the expression of a whole historical movement, it is hard understand. Historians can only be led to such a conclusion by the nwing considerations: (i) That history is written by learned men; t. so it is natural and agreeable to them to believe that the pursuit fheir calling is the basis of the movement of the whole of humanity, i as a similar belief would be natural and agreeable to merchants, ificulturists, or soldiers (such a belief on their part does not find Session simply because merchants and soldiers don’t write history); f. (2) that spiritual activity, enlightenment, civilisation, culture, ideas : all vague, indefinite conceptions, under cover of which they can con- iiently use phrases having a less definite signification, and so easily i ught under any theory.
lut to say nothing of the inner dignity of histories of this kind (pos- y they are of use for some one or for something), the histories of ture, towards which all general histories tend more and more to ap- ,ximate, are noteworthy from the fact that though they give a serious I detailed analysis of various religious, philosophic, and political doc- aes as causes of events, every time they have to describe an actual jtorical event, as, for instance, the campaign of 1812, they uncon- nisly describe it as the effect of the exercise of power, frankly saying t that campaign was the work of Napoleon’s will. In saying this, the torians of culture unconsciously contradict themselves, to prove that new force t 1 - j have invented is not the expression of historical events.
and that the sole means of explaining history is by that power which they had apparently rejected.
Ill
A steam-engine moves. The question is asked, How is it moved? A peasant answers, It is the devil moving it. Another man says, The steam- engine moves because the wheels are going round. A third maintains that the cause of the motion is to be found in the smoke floated from it by the wind.
The peasant’s contention is irrefutable. To refute him some one must prove to him that there is no devil, or another peasant must explain that it is not a devil, but a German who moves the steamer. Then from their contradictory views they see that both are wrong. But the man who says the cause is the movement of the wheels refutes himself, seeing that having once entered on the path of analysis, he ought to proceed further and further along it; he ought to explain the cause of the wheels moving. And he has not to stop in his search for a cause till he finds the ultimate cause of the movement of the steam-engine in the steam compressed in the boiler. As for the man who explained the movement of the steam- engine as due to the smoke being blown back from it, he has simply noticed that the wheel explanation was insufficient, and pitching on the first accompanying symptom, gave that out as his cause.
The only conception which can explain the movement of the steamer is the conception of a force equal to the movement that is seen.
The only conception by means of which the movements of nations can be explained is a conception of a force equal to the whole movement of the nations.
Yet under this conception there are included by various historians forces of the most various kinds, and all unequal to the movement that is seen. Some see in it a force directly pertaining to heroes, as the peasant sees the devil in the steam-engine. Others, a force resulting from several other forces, like the movement of the wheels; a third class, intellectual influence, like the smoke.
So long as histories are written of individual persons—whether they are Caesars and Alexanders, or Luthers and Voltaires—and not the history of all, without one exception, all the people taking part in an event, there is no possibility of describing the movement of humanity without a conception of a force impelling men to direct their activity to one end. And the only conception of this kind familiar to historians is power.
This conception is the sole handle by means of which the material of history, as at present expounded, can be dealt with; and the historian who should, like Buckle, break off this handle, without discovering any other means of dealing with historical material, would only be depriving himself of the last chance of dealing with it. The necessity of the conception of the exercise of power to explain the phenomena of history is
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