From the early nineties, Japanese politics began to shift to the right and become more nationalistic, a process hastened by the collapse of the Social Democratic Party, which had always been a staunch opponent of Japanese rearmament. [999] Japanese ruling politicians grew more aggressive towards China, displaying impatience with traditional deferential tendencies towards their neighbour, increased concern about China ’s rise, and frustration with what they saw as China ’s exploitation of Japan ’s colonial past. [1000] In 1996 for the first time the proportion of those saying in an annual poll that they did not have friendly feelings towards the Chinese exceeded those that did. The crisis over North Korea and its threatened development of nuclear weapons, together with its abduction of Japanese citizens between 1977 and 1983, served to harden nationalist sentiment: indeed, the North Korean threat was seen as a proxy for the Chinese threat, thereby helping to ratchet up hostility towards China as well. [1001] In 1999 an extreme nationalist, Ishihara Shintaro, was elected governor of Tokyo: previously anti-American, he quickly became rabidly hostile towards China. Meanwhile, Japan entered into a new defence agreement with the United States which was clearly directed against China and which implicitly involved Japan in the defence of Taiwan. [1002] The growing enmity towards China found its fullest expression to date during Junichiro Koizumi’s premiership between 2001 and 2006, with his annual visits in his capacity as prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine – a politically inspired memorial to Japan’s fallen soldiers, including Class A war criminals – which were intended to encourage nationalism at home while also being provocative towards China. Since Koizumi, however, both the short premiership of Shinzo Abe, previously regarded as hawkish towards China, and especially that of Yasuo Fukuda have revealed a desire in ruling circles to temper the hostility of the Koizumi era and seek a more accommodating relationship with China. [1003] It remains to be seen what course Japan will steer during the premiership of Taro Aso, who also has a nationalist reputation, but his period in office is likely to prove of short duration.

Japan, meanwhile, finds itself more or less isolated in East Asia. Although it has been generous in bestowing aid on many countries in the region, it has failed to address its wartime legacy, which is a continuing source of resentment for many of its neighbours, especially South Korea and China. It has remained, furthermore, relatively aloof from its neighbours, having refused to open up its market and resisted entering into multilateral, rather than bilateral, arrangements with them until its hand was finally forced by China ’s recent initiatives with ASEAN. [1004] There have been two recent illustrations of Japan ’s continued isolation. The first concerned its failed bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2005, when China succeeded in mobilizing most of the region in opposition to Japan’s proposed membership, thereby effectively torpedoing it. [1005] The second example was the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in 2005, provoked partly by Japan’s UN bid but mainly by the publication of a new school history textbook in Japan that sought to downplay Japanese crimes against China during the last war; [1006] in this case, as in that of the United Nations, the sympathies of the region were overwhelmingly on the side of the Chinese rather than the Japanese government. [1007] In both instances, the underlying cause of Japan ’s isolation is the same: its failure to address not only China ’s grievances about the last war but nearly everyone else’s as well. [1008]

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