China ’s rise requires a fundamental shift in Japanese thinking – indeed, Japan ’s interests would have been best served if it had been willing to address the wartime treatment of its neighbours several decades ago [1009] – but there remains little sign of it. Instead Japan has clung to variants of its post-war stance, with the result that China has succeeded, with the adroitness of its recent diplomacy in the region, in outmanoeuvring it. Meanwhile, the relationship between the two remains frozen in the manner of the Cold War, with each twist and turn being seen in terms of a zero-sum game. [1010] The issues of contention between the two are many, though the historical questions clearly predominate over all others. In terms of the present, by far the most important – and dangerous – issue concerns the disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands and the similarly disputed maritime border in the East China Sea. [1011] There have already been clashes over the islands, most notably in 1990. [1012] Unlike the disputed islands in the South China Sea, there are known to be significant oil and gas deposits in the area, thereby lending them an added strategic significance. China has offered to shelve the issue of sovereignty, as it has done with the Spratlys, in favour of joint development, but the Japanese have rejected the idea. The Chinese, meanwhile, have begun exploration in a disputed area of sea. [1013] An agreement between the two countries on joint exploration and development would help to ease tension, though it would not resolve the underlying issue of sovereignty over the islands or the maritime border. [1014] Until some kind of agreement is reached, this dispute is the one most likely to provide a flashpoint between the two countries. [1015]
At times of crisis, the Chinese government has tried hard to restrain popular attitudes of resentment towards Japan for fear that they might get out of control; sometimes, however, they have spilt over, as was the case with the large and angry demonstrations that took place in several Chinese cities in 2005. While Taiwan and the United States have been important factors in Chinese nationalism, especially in the 1990s, its growth has been driven, above all, by feelings of resentment and hostility towards Japan. These remain much stronger than the enmity displayed towards the United States. [1016] Apart from the Korean War, there is no history of conflict between China and the US. Moreover, the two countries succeeded in 1971 in remaking their relationship and putting it on an entirely new footing that has survived to the present day. They are also, of course, geographically separated by the expanse of the Pacific Ocean. In contrast, the bitter enmity between the Japanese and Chinese has existed for over a century without interruption. There is simply no modern tradition of compromise or coexistence between them and yet they are by far the two most powerful countries in East Asia. [1017] The Chinese may not particularly like the Americans but they generally respect them; in contrast, as I have frequently found, the Chinese – including the highly educated – will often volunteer that they hate the Japanese. [1018] The rise of China, moreover, has if anything served to harden attitudes towards Japan. As Shi Yinhong has observed, the view is now widely expressed that: ‘If China concedes to Japan it means that China cannot rise. What is the point of rising if we have to concede to Japan?’ [1019] It is, nonetheless, strongly in China ’s interests to play for time. Notwithstanding that Japan remains East Asia’s largest economy (according to GDP by market exchange rates) and by far its most advanced, time, as always it would seem, is on China’s side. Assuming that China continues to grow at a brisk pace, the balance of power between the two will continue to move in China’s favour, [1020] with the latter steadily emerging as the fulcrum of the East Asian economy. [1021] Even for Japan, China is now of great economic significance: it became Japan’s largest export market in 2008, overtaking the United States, with the value of Japanese exports to China doubling between 2000 and 2003, [1022] and it has also become an important manufacturing base for many Japanese multinationals. Japan, in short, is being drawn into a relationship of growing economic interdependence with China. But this does not mean that relations between the two countries will inevitably grow more harmonious: the underlying antagonism between them is far too deeply rooted for that.
Map 12. The Disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands