Yeltsin полностью

13 Gaidar, Dni porazhenii i pobed, 190–91; author’s second interview with Yegor Gaidar (January 31, 2002). Yeltsin told Gaidar after the meeting that he had tried unsuccessfully to reach him by phone to tell him of the removal of Lopukhin. Gaidar did not believe it.

14 Yeltsin left Gaidar to sign off on the Gerashchenko appointment on his behalf. Gaidar later called it the worst mistake he made in 1992 and said it would have been much better to go with Gerashchenko’s predecessor, Georgii Matyukhin. Yeltsin also told associates he almost immediately regretted the appointment. Gaidar, Dni porazhenii i pobed, 195; Yu, M. Baturin et al., Epokha Yel’tsina: ocherki politicheskoi istorii (The Yeltsin epoch: essays in political history) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2001), 235.

15 Baturin et al., Epokha, 251.

16 Vyacheslav Terekhov, interview with the author (June 5, 2001).

17 The greatest controversy was over the exclusion of Khizha, with whom Yeltsin did not want to work closely. One deputy protested that there had been a “gentlemen’s agreement” to put him on the final list, but Yeltsin denied it. Interviewed in the lobby after the action, he said,“My opinion had to be taken into account, too.” Vladimir Todres, “S”ezd” (The congress), Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 15, 1992; Nikolai Andreyev and Sergei Chugayev, “U Gaidara—golosa iskrennikh storonnikov, u Chernomyrdina—doveriye s”ezda” (Gaidar got the votes of sincere supporters and Chernomyrdin got the trust of the congress), Izvestiya, December 15, 1992. Khizha left the government in May 1993.

18 Chernomyrdin was deputy minister of the oil and gas industry from 1982 to 1985, answering for the west Siberian fields. His responsibilities included the pipelines being built through Sverdlovsk oblast. He lived at the time, he told me, in the city of Tyumen, the capital of the province bordering Sverdlovsk on the east. He was appointed minister in February 1985 and saw much of Yeltsin when Yeltsin was department head and secretary in the Central Committee apparatus, touring the Siberian fields with him and Gorbachev in September 1985. Chernomyrdin, as a member of the CPSU Central Committee, attended the October 1987 plenum, where he walked up to Yeltsin and shook his hand at the intermission. Chernomyrdin, interview with the author (September 15, 2000).

19 Yel’tsin, Zapiski, 326.

20 “Viktor Stepanovich . . . almost openly sympathized with Gazprom, which he had created practically with his own hands.” Boris Yel’tsin, Prezidentskii marafon (Presidential marathon) (Moscow: AST, 2000),120.

21 See on this point Daniel S. Treisman, “Fighting Inflation in a Transitional Regime: Russia’s Anomalous Stabilization,” World Politics 50 (January 1998), 250–52.

22 Gaidar, Dni porazhenii i pobed, 183.

23 Yel’tsin, Zapiski, 256, 258. Not all managers in the petroleum industry favored price controls. As Gaidar describes, quite a few wanted the restrictions to be lifted.

24 Author’s interviews with Lev Ponomarëv and Gleb Yakunin (both on January 21, 2001). See also Valerii Vyzhutovich, “My podderzhivayem Yel’tsina uslovno” (We support Yeltsin conditionally), Izvestiya, October 7, 1991.

25 Yurii Burtin, “Gorbachev prodolzhayetsya” (Gorbachev is continuing), in Burtin and Eduard Molchanov, eds., God posle avgusta: gorech’ i vybor (A year after August: bitterness and choice) (Moscow: Literatura i politika, 1992), 60. See for details Viktor Sheinis, Vzlët i padeniye parlamenta: perelomnyye gody v rossiiskoi politike, 1985–1993 (The rise and fall of parliament: years of change in Russian politics, 1985–93) (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, Fond INDEM, 2005), 677–87.

26 Yel’tsin, Zapiski, 245.

27 Gennadii Burbulis, second interview, conducted by Yevgeniya Al’bats (February 14, 2001).

28 Baturin et al., Epokha, 202.

29 Chernomyrdin interview.

30 Anders Åslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), 198.

31 Boris Fëdorov, interview with the author (September 22, 2001). In September 1993 Yeltsin wanted to have Fëdorov replace Gerashchenko in the central bank, but canned the idea due to Chernomyrdin’s strong opposition.

32 Baturin et al., Epokha, 256. On fiscal and monetary policy after Fëdorov, see Åslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy, 200–203; and Treisman, “Fighting Inflation in a Transitional Regime,” 235–65.

33 “Obrashcheniye prezidenta k sograzhdanam” (Address of the president to his fellow citizens), Rossiiskaya gazeta, August 20, 1992.